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Abstract
An autonomous system has been widely applied for various civil/military re-
search because of its versatile capability of understanding high-level intent and
direction of a surrounding environment and targets of interest. However, as au-
tonomous systems can be out of control to cause serious loss, injury, or death in
the worst case, the verification of their functionalities has got increasing atten-
tion. For that reason, this study is focused on the verification of a heterogeneous
multi-agent autonomous system. The thesis first presents an overview of formal
methods, especially focuses on model checking for autonomous systems verifica-
tion. Then, six case studies are presented to verify the decision making behaviours
of multi-agent system using two basic scenarios: surveillance and convoy. The
initial system considered in the surveillance mission consists of a ground con-
trol system and a micro aerial vehicle. Their decision-making behaviours are
represented by means of Kripke model and computational tree logic is used to
specify the properties of this system. For automatic verification, MCMAS (Model
Checker for Multi-Agent Systems) is adopted due to its novel capability to ac-
commodate the multi-agent system. After that, the initial system is extended
to include a substitute micro aerial vehicle. These initial case studies are then
further extended based on SEAS DTC exemplar 2 dealing with behaviours of
convoy protection. This case study includes now a ground control system, an
unmanned aerial vehicle, and an unmanned ground vehicle. The MCMAS suc-
cessfully verifies the targeting behaviours of the team-level unmanned systems.
Reversely, these verification results help retrospectively improve the design of
decision-making algorithms by considering additional agents and behaviours
during four steps of scenario modification. Consequently, the last scenario deals
with the system composed of a ground control system, two unmanned aerial
vehicles, and four unmanned ground vehicles with fault-tolerant and communi-
cations relay capabilities. In conclusion, this study demonstrates the feasibility
of model checking algorithms as a verification tool of a multi-agent system in
an initial design stage. Moreover, this research can be an important first step of
the certification of multi-agent autonomous systems for the domains of robotics,
aerospace and aeronautics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Aim of research
An autonomous system is capable of understanding higher level
intent and direction. From this understanding and its perception of
its environment, such a system is able to take appropriate action to
bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action,
from a number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight
and control, although these may still be present. Although the over-
all activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will be predictable,
individual actions may not be.
This is a definition of autonomous systems [1]. To use such autonomous systems
has attracted extensive attention to many civil/military applications as Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). They are commonly used for the tasks associated with
four elements: dull, dirty, dangerous and deep [2]. Surveillance mission, a role of
communication relay, or acting as a air-to air refuelling tanker can be considered
as dull tasks. Dirty tasks are missions in contaminated environments by CBRN
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear) elements. For instance, UAVs
are being applied for the reconnaissance over civilian fire locations that is dan-
gerous to human because of smoke and flames. Moreover, UAVs are recently
committed to the battlefield, for example, Predator in Libya, for the performance
of dangerous tasks. Lastly, deep tasks are kinds of penetrating enemy territory
to complete observation and attack missions. As various tasks of autonomous
systems get introduced, safety concerns to the operations in a general public area
have been raised because autonomous systems can be out of control enough to
cause loss, injury, or death to persons or property. Safety cannot be guaranteed
simply by good design because the any behaviour of system may be upset by
mistakes made during its production, installation or use[52]. Furthermore, to ap-
ply autonomous systems to more complex missions the structure of systems has
got more complicated, which increases the possibility of malfunctions. Therefore,
PhD Thesis: Jiyoung Choi
∣∣∣ 1
Chapter 1. Introduction
aviation communities in most of the countries have focused on the regulatory
authorities and certification to supervise the manufacture and operation of au-
tonomous systems. Federal Aviation Administration in USA issued a Notice of
Policy on Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System in 2007 [3] and has
focused on the development of certification standards to make unmanned aircraft
system uniformly certified. SEAS DTC in UK has also been focusing on certifica-
tion, especially for safety-related issues, in their research scope [4]. This study has
been motivated by this demand of certification for autonomous systems. Since the
research about the regulation for autonomous systems is in the initial phase, the
most important part for the current certification issues is to abstract the essential
properties which must be valid in autonomous systems in realistic application
scenarios. For that reason, this thesis deals with several practical scenarios and
aims to move forward towards the verification of heterogeneous autonomous
systems.
1.2 Related Work
Beyond a single-agent autonomous system, a group of autonomous systems could
be more reliable due to inherent redundancy to unexpectedness. Here, the agent
means autonomous program which should select an proper action that is expected
to maximise its performance measure, given the evidence provided by the per-
cept sequence and whatever built-in knowledge it has[5]. In this background, a
multi-agent autonomous system has been recently considered as a substitute to
the single-agent autonomous system for higher mission successfulness[6]. In the
reference [7], a team of UAVs were used to search an area of interest that contains
regions of opportunity and potential hazard cooperatively. Kloetzer and Belta [8]
developed a hierarchical framework for mission planning and control of robotic
groups. Moreover, mission planning and optimization for multiple UAVs has
been studied by using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [9, 10]. The temporal logic
was used to perform motion planning for robots as well [11, 12]. For complicated
systems, there have been attempts to verify the reliability of them at the design
level by using a simulation in a virtual environment [13], a test with a mock-up,
and formal methods. Firstly, the test with a mock-up costs a lot of money and
time and does not guarantee the safety during the operation. Although the sim-
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ulation costs less than the mock-up test, it is not easy to consider all the possible
scenarios and situations. On the other hand, the formal methods are based on
solid mathematical techniques and offer quantifiable answers to questions related
with reliability of systems. Chaudemar et al. proposed a formal specification
of the layered architecture of the UAV control system within the safety analysis
using the Event-B method [14]. The Event-B is one of formal languages developed
to specify and model the complex system with refinement mechanism [15]. In
the reference [16], a formal approach to reactive system design was presented
using POLIS [17]. Another formal approach, reverse engineering, was used to
describe a case study involving a mission control system developed by the NASA
Jet Propulsion Laboratory to command an unmanned spacecraft in [18]. Model-
checking [19] is an automatic technique based on formal methods for verifying
a finite state system to automatically check whether the target system satisfies
the required properties or not. There are three sub-processes in model-checking:
modelling, specification, and verification. The system to be verified is abstracted
and translated into a language used in a model checker. The properties which
we are interested in are specified by means of temporal logic. Finally, the model
checker verifies the system properties and gives the result with yes or no on the
system satisfying them. In [, baie08] model-checking technique is compared to
a computer chess program. A model checker examines all possible systems sce-
narios in a systematic manner like a computer chess program checks all possible
moves. In this way, model-checking provides exhaustive verification ability that
makes far more wide-reaching states verified than testing and simulation. Thus,
model checkers are widely used to verify the safety-critical or high-autonomy
systems. SPIN [20, 21] and SMV [22] are the most widely-used model checkers
and have pros and cons respectively. SPIN was originated from automated pro-
tocol validation techniques introduced by Holzmann to deal with industrial-size
problems [23]. Holzmann and et al. studied about new reduction strategies for
conventional reachability analysis, as used in [23], to reduce either run time or
memory requirements by four to six times [24] and this study based the SPIN. Al-
though the SPIN was developed to deal with protocol validation, the application
area of it is not limited in computer science. Havelund et al. [25] used SPIN to
verify the multi-threaded plan execution module of a spacecraft control system.
The SPIN was also used for the verification of a complex and cooperative UAV
monitoring task [26]. SMV was developed to avoid the state explosion problem
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in computer science subject [27], however, its application has been very wide. In
[28], a software system for Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System II (TCAS
II) was analysed using the SMV. The SMV was also used to verify the discrete-state
algorithms [29] and Computational Tree Logic (CTL) specifications for a Statechart
[30]. Moreover, Pecheur et al. [31, 32] used the SMV for the development of au-
tonomous controllers and the verification of diagnosability based on Livingstone,
a model-based health-monitoring system, that can detect and diagnose anomalies
and suggest possible recovery actions. While SPIN uses an automaton approach
and only LTL formulae, SMV is a symbolic model checking tool and can mainly
deal with CTL problems. Choi [33] investigates the explicit model checker SPIN
on commercial flight guidance systems based on her prior work with the use of
the symbolic model checker NuSMV [34]. There are the other model checkers
for more complex system. Mohamed and Hans-Michael used SESA to check the
validation of distributed multi-agent reconfigurable embedded control systems
[35]. Furthermore, Du et al. [36] proposed a new class of labelled Petri net (LPN)
for the testing and analysis of the obligations and accountability of participants
in cooperative systems. Bordini et al. [37, 38] introduced AgentSpeak(F) to verify
a multi-agent system and associated it with the SPIN and JPF [39]. In references
[40, 41], Siminiceanu and Ciardo used SMART which is a software package pro-
viding a seamless environment for the logic and probabilistic analysis of complex
systems. In addition to the temporal logic, modal logics including modal opera-
tors to reason about knowledge, beliefs, and strategies are considered for model
checking. The tool MCMAS [42] is one of the recently-developed model checkers
that can reason about time, knowledge, and correct behaviours of agents. Rai-
mondi et al. [43] verified diagnosability and recoverability of Livingstone models
using the MCMAS. Furthermore, Molnar and Veres [44] used the MCMAS for
the verification of autonomous underwater vehicles as well. This research for
verification of autonomous systems using model checkers can be a cornerstone of
certification of autonomous systems. Webster et al. have showed the feasibility of
using formal methods within the certification of UAVs for civil airspace [45, 13].
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1.3 Contributions of the thesis
This thesis kindly shows the whole cycle of model checking for verifying multi-
agent system and modifying system/property using verification result. The multi-
agent systems dealt in this thesis are all not from book but from the real world
problem. Therefore, the systems have more number of agents than those dealt in
the previous research [46, 47, 48] and consist of heterogeneous agents. These four
aspects can make this thesis be novel in the related research area.
The main contribution of this thesis is the demonstration of the feasibility of
model checking for verifying the decision-making logic of multi-agent systems in
the design-level. Although many researchers have mentioned about the feasibility
of model checkers in the design-level, it is hard to find the studies that directly
focus on that purpose. In this thesis, each scenario is inspired by the previous
one. The first scenario related to a surveillance mission has been enhanced by
means of adding the substitute MAV in the second scenario. This complementary
measure comes out from the analysis of the verification result in the first scenario.
The convoy scenario has been also modified in each phase to reflect the mistake
found in the previous phase or to add supplementary agents/behaviours. As
a result, the final scenario deals with seven agents, two environmental agents,
fault-tolerant behaviours, improved safety properties, and communications relay
behaviours. All these processes show how the users can apply a model checking
algorithm to improve system design. Furthermore, by extending each scenario
not only the lessons learned are transferred, but also some behaviours already
verified before do not have to be analysed again if they are not related with a
modification of system/property for the extension. Therefore it can lead to an
efficient and practical design tool for verification of autonomous systems.
The second key contribution of this study is that the multi-agent systems dealt
in this thesis are captured from the real world problem. The first multi-agent sys-
tem in Chapter 3 is reproduced from MoD Grand Challenge. The Grand Challenge
was a competition held by Ministry of Defence in UK. Because performance of
this competition was assessed by not only innovative idea but also by implemen-
tation techniques, the multi-agent system used in the competition was practical
and realistic. Also, the basic scenario for multi-agent system used in Chapter 4 to
7 is originated SEAS DTC Exemplar 2. Exemplar 2 is a scenario candidate to guide
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researchers in their study related to military problem focusing on realistic issues.
The multi-agent system in Exemplar 2 is intended to be of practical use and the
events considered in Exemplar 2 is probable in real battlefield. By using these
practical and reasonable multi-agent system, this thesis demonstrates that aca-
demic competence is successfully applied to solve real-world, industry-supplied
problems.
Furthermore, this thesis represents the scalability of the MCMAS which can
verify the extended multi-agent system consisting of nine agents including vari-
ous environmental elements. The previous model checkers, e.g. SPIN and SMV,
have the limitation of handling many number of agents [46, 48]. From that reason,
they have dealt with the multi-agent systems composed of only two/three agents
and have not considered an environmental element. Many researchers using the
SPIN or SMV have acknowledged the problems of state-space explosion due to
capability limitation of those model checkers. However, the MCMAS deals with
nine agents (including Environment Agent) successfully in this thesis. In the final
system in Chapter 7, the possible worlds and accessibility relations become more
complex and interactive, so the reachable states of that scenario exceeds twenty
millions. Moreover, the MCMAS still has the possibility that it can cope with more
agents depending on the performance of computing resources. This scalability is
an absolute strength of the MCMAS, and this thesis exhibits it clearly and for the
first time with various mission scenarios of multi-agent systems.
As above-mentioned, the multi-agent systems described in this thesis are het-
erogeneous. The heterogeneous multi-agent system is more complicated because
the interactions among the agents are more elaborate, and the priority of properties
becomes more important for correct behaviours. Despite inevitable complexity,
the heterogeneous multi-agent system can perform various missions in a versatile
way not only in the battlefields but also in the civil applications. The multi-agent
system considered in this study consists of ground vehicles, aerial vehicles, and
manned agents. Additionally, the events which can be faced in real situations with
uncertainty are taken into account for an individual agent. This heterogeneous
system can make us approach more practically and deal with realistic scenario.
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1.4 Structure of the thesis
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: First of all, the back-
ground knowledge to understand model checking is presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 describes the surveillance mission by a single MAV and a GCS. The
scenario of this chapter is defined in Section 3.1. System modelling using Kripke
approach is explained in Section 3.2, and property modelling using CTL is de-
scribed in Section 3.3. Then, verification process and discussion are shown in
Section 3.4 in detail. The scenario composed of the MAV and GCS is extended
to a multi-agent system including two MAVs and a GCS in Section 3.5. Fur-
thermore, the process of modelling and verification are unfolded from Section
3.6 to Section 3.8. Chapter 4 to Chapter 7 deal with a new mission scenario for
convoying the UGVs using the UAVs and GCS. The scenario starts with a single
UGV, an UAV, and a GCS in Section 4.1 and the following sections are composed
of system modelling in Section 4.2, property modelling in Section 4.3, and ver-
ification and discussion in Section 4.4. In Chapter 5, the multi-agent system is
extended to a larger multi-agent system possessing two UAVs, four UGVs, and a
GCS as explained in Section 5.1. Moreover, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 show more
complicated multi-agent systems with fault-tolerant and communications relay
behaviour, respectively. These three chapters have the same sections describing
system modelling, property modelling, verification and discussion as Chapter 4.
Conclusions and future works are discussed in Chapter 8.
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Model Checking-Background
Knowledge
2.1 Formal methods
2.1.1 Formal methods and Systems Life-cycle
Formal methods can be regarded as different things to different people. The term
is originated in formal logic, but now used in computer science area to refer to a
wide range of mathematically based computing activities [49]. In this thesis, the
most proper definition of formal methods [50] is that ‘A formal method is a set
of tools and notations (with a formal semantics) used to specify unambiguously
the requirements of a computer system that supports the proof of properties of
that specification and proofs of correctness of an eventual implementation with
respect to that specification.’ Therefore, formal methods are not so much methods
according to this definition. In [51], Rushby identifies four levels of rigour in the
implementation of formal methods:
• Level 0: No use of formal methods Specification documents are written in
natural languages, pseudo-code or a programming language, augmented
with diagrams and equations. Verification is performed manually by re-
viewing and inspecting. Validation is based on testing that is determined
by the nature of the requirements, the specification and program structure.
• Level 1: Use of concepts and notation from discrete mathematics The some
parts of requirements and specification documents written in natural lan-
guage are replaced with notations and concepts derived from logic and
discrete mathematics. This does not represent a full adoption of a formal
approach.
• Level 2: Use of formalised specification languages with some mechanised
support tools Formalised specification languages provide standardized no-
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tation for discrete mathematics. Hence they can usually provide some auto-
mated methods of checking for certain classes of faults. Proofs are normally
performed informally and referred to as rigorous proofs. However, several
methods in this level provide explicit formal logics of deduction that would
permit formal proof, even manually.
• Level 3: Use of fully formal specification languages with comprehensive
support environments, including mechanised theorem proving or proof
checking The fully formal specification languages employ a strictly defined
logic and provide methods for the use of formal proofs. The formal proving
methods permits the use of mechanised techniques such as proof check-
ers and theorem provers. In this level, the probability of detection faults
increases within the various descriptions of the system. Moreover, mech-
anised techniques effectively remove the possibility of faulty reasoning.
However, the fully formal specification languages costs a lot of effort and
money in use and are generally very restrictive.
The use of formal methods is motivated by the expectation that mathematical
analysis can contribute to the reliability and robustness of a system [52]. To
develop a reliable system formal methods can be used at various phases through
the life-cycle of a system. The systems life-cycle is a process of developing, or
sometimes altering information of, systems [53]. It can be divided into five phases:
Design, Implementation, Testing, Evaluation, Analysis. System design can be
constructed from motivation, conception, or requirements. After that, according
to the design concept, system is developed and sometimes integrated with the
other system. A developed system is now operated and tested for evaluation.
Analysis of the evaluation can result in phase-out and disposal of the system,
maintenance, or modifying the system design [54]. In life-cycle, a system can be
validated its performance whether it satisfies the requirements or not in testing
and evaluation phases. It means if there is mistake by a designer in an initial
design phase, it is probably found in the testing phase. Therefore, if the system
does not fulfill the requirements of developers by this mistake, its development
life-cycle resumes from the design phase again. In that case, huge loss of effort
and cost can be anticipated.
Therefore, to prevent the propagation of mistake in a design phase, formal
methods can be applied to verification of a system in this level. The significance
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of applying formal methods to a design-level certification of critical and real-
time systems has been clearly understood among systems developers, and there
has been an increased proliferation to study formal methods, not only in theory
but also in application for autonomous systems. Applying the formal methods
entails the construction of a high-level description or a mathematical model of the
system of interest. The model can then be subjected to a variety of analyses such
as simulation, model checking and performance evaluation. As such processes
can be automated and performed iteratively, the formal methods approach can
be incorporated into system design at an early stage and offers a systematic
approach during the design-level with a great degree of automation. In this
context, a systematic approach represents for investigating events, gathering new
knowledge, and then correcting or integrating it with previous knowledge of a
system. In order to apply formal methods to a system design-level the tasks to be
performed are logically partitioned into three parts:
Modelling The system design or operating scenario is converted to a formalism
that is acceptable to automated verification tools, called model checkers. In some
cases, abstraction may be used to suppress unimportant details of the design.
Specification The next step is to state the necessary properties that the system
must satisfy. Again, it is necessary to use a formalism that is acceptable to the
model checker. In this process a temporal logic is usually used for hardware and
software systems.
Verification The model checker then verifies the validity of the specification
against the proposed model iteratively. The most common mode of operation is
for these tools to verify a system’s state-space for validity of the specifications
and to produce verification results. For negative results produced by the tool,
the counter example has to be analyzed, and then the problem can be traced back
either to the model or specification incorrectness. After that, suitable amendment
steps can be taken.
The outcome of this exercise is that the design has been proof-checked exhaus-
tively, and all possible modes of system operation.
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2.1.2 Formal modelling
Formal modelling techniques have originally evolved around the study of reactive
systems. A reactive system/program constantly maintains an interaction with its
environment rather than to result in some final value. The reactive programs
widely include concurrent and real-time programs, embedded and process control
programs, and operating systems such as a plane or a nuclear reactor. Because
some reactive systems are not planned to terminate, they cannot be specified
by a relation between initial and final states, but must be identified by their
ongoing behaviour [55]. Therefore, its specification must be done in terms of its
ongoing behaviour that changes with time. This definition closely tallies with an
informal description of a robot application, and many researchers have considered
applying these techniques to studying robot applications. To date several formal
modelling techniques such as Message Sequence Charts (MSCs) [56], Finite State
Automata (FSA) [57], Petri nets (PNs) [58], Kripke models and temporal logics
have been proposed to specify, analyse, understand and verify the correctness of
reactive systems.
The MSCs is a language for the description of message flow using graphic and
text. It is usually applied for communicating and concurrent processes which can
be easily represented as a message flow. Because only the explicit message flows
can be specified by the MSCs, other details of behaviours must be deduced from
the specification. Therefore, incomplete message specification can be used for
more practical scenarios such as communication failure among multi-agent sys-
tems. However, the conventional MSC represents only a deterministic behaviour
intrinsically. Deterministic property in this context means that for everything
that happens there are conditions such that, given them, nothing else could hap-
pen [59]. Therefore, to conduct non-deterministic system high-level message
sequence charts [60], which is extended from MSCs by allowing interaction and
non-deterministic choices, are needed.
A model set used in the FSA, an automaton, consists of states, an initial state,
an input alphabet, and a transition function that maps input symbols and current
states to a next state. Although the FSA has an expressive power, in case multi-
agent systems are required, explicit marking of states with channels and clocks, so
called timed-automata, are essential in order to synchronize the whole systems.
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Timed-automata [59] is equipped with a finite set of real-valued clock variables to
model the behaviour of time-critical systems. However, the addition of channels
and clocks makes automated systems complicated, large in size and determinis-
tic. To express non-deterministic behaviour in addition, nondeterministic finite
automaton (NFA) [61] is needed further. NFA is a canonical finite automata which
is able to jump into several possible next states from each state and a given input
alphabet.
Petri nets are an alternative method for modelling concurrent systems and
computation community. The PNs are based on both mathematical and visual
approach. A net is a bipartite directed graph consisting of places and net-transitions
[55]. Places represent conditionals and transition represent events when a net
models a system. Inherently, the Petri nets has a merit of modelling generality, but
conventional Petri nets are not expressive enough to represent real-time system,
and additionally including uncertainty in time. To tackle these type of systems,
various type of canonical Petri nets are considered such as timed-Petri nets [62,
63, 64] and stochastic Petri nets [65].
The Kripke model is pioneer in the sense that every modal logics associates
with not just a single interpretation, but a set of possible interpretations, called
as possible world by S. Kripke in the 1950s and 1960s. This formalism is widely
used in highly complex and zero fault tolerance problems such as verification of
real-time software and correctness of logic-system design. The main advantage
of this approach is its ability to represent real world uncertainty using a formal,
yet intuitive model in the form of a directed graph.
2.1.3 Kripke modelling
Mathematically, a Kripke model [19] is represented a triple M = (W, W0, R, L) as
shown in Table 2.1.
W is the set of possible worlds
W0 is the set of initial possible worlds
R is a relation on W, (R ⊆W ×W), accessibility relation
L is a function L : W → P(atoms), labelling function
Table 2.1: The mathematical representation of Kripke model
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Graphically, a Kripke model can be viewed as a directed graph, i.e., a set of
labelled nodes, connected by directed edges as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: The graphical representation of Kripke model
The nodes are represented by possible worlds, the labelling function Li denotes what
holds in each of these nodes, and the edge Ri, represents accessibility relation for
the transition between the possible worlds. Although these models are simple, they
are expressive enough to capture temporal behaviours that are most important
for reasoning about reactive systems. An expected behaviour of a system is tied
down using the following mechanisms:
Possible worlds - The states that system components can stay at during operation.
Labelling functions - Propositional formulae representing unambiguous behaviours
in each world.
Transition functions - Discrete conditions governing the traversals between worlds.
This kind of Kripke model is suitable for unambiguous modelling and repre-
sentation of hybrid control approaches where discrete decision making such as
obstacle avoidance, speed increase, flight-path change co-exist with continuous
system dynamics. Another critical aspect of real-time systems is the order of task
execution, also known as ‘computation sequence’. The Kripke models allow us
to capture this in a compact manner, unlike the FSA. Moreover, the same Kripke
model can be reused to capture varying levels of granularity that is desired for
validation. It is important to define the meaning of the term ‘granularity of tran-
sitions’ here. When a system switches from one mode of operation to another, the
transitions ought to be such that they are atomic in the sense that no observable
state of the system can result from executing part of a transition. If the transitions
are too coarse, one may not include some states that are observable. Conversely,
if the transitions are too fine, a state space explosion may occur or other spurious
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errors may creep into the system. A state space explosion refers to the exponential
rise in the number of states in the model related to the number of components that
actually make up the state. With computational and algorithmic advances, mod-
ern software for model checking can handle a large number of states, so the issue
is not the computational difficulty, but the challenge of retaining modelling trans-
parency. Consequently, the main reasons for the success of the Kripke approach
is its ability to represent real world uncertainty formally so it has been applied for
complicated and safety-critical problems like real-time software [66, 67].
Additionally Kripke models can capture the temporal behaviour. However,
because the representation of real system can be too complex and the size of
states and variables become very large to describe the real system concretely, it is
important to balance between the simple representation of model and the accurate
reflection of the real system.
2.2 Formal speciﬁcation: veriﬁable logic
2.2.1 Propositional logic
Propositional logic [59] is a two-valued logic, where formulae are assigned true or
false values. Therefore, it can be regarded as a verifiable logic since the formulae
can be checked whether they are true or not in some systems. The semantics of
this logic is represented by using truth tables or inductive rules on the structure
of the formula itself. Generally speaking, there are two types of truth value asser-
tion: static and dynamic. If there is a fixed and time-independent truth value, the
assertion is termed as static. In contrary, if an assertion is time-dependent, it is
considered as dynamic. The propositional logic is also one of the logics that stud-
ies joining/modifying entire propositions, statements or sentences to form more
complicated ones and deriving the logical relationships and properties by com-
bining or altering the statements. Logical connectives such as the words ‘and’ and
‘or’, and the rules determining the truth-values of the propositions are involved
in propositional logic. It also connects with the way of modifying statements, for
example, using the addition of the word ‘not’ changes an affirmative statement
into a negative statement.
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2.2.2 Modal logic
A modal logic [68, 69] attempts to deal with modalities. ‘Modal’ means to qualify
the truth of a judgment. Traditionally, there are three modes represented by the
modal logic: possibility, probability, and necessity. The logics for dealing with
a number of the related terms such as eventually, formerly, can, could, might, may,
and must, are also called as modal logics. The representative branches of study
in the modal logic are as follows: alethic modalities (necessity, possibility, and
impossibility), epistemic logic (certainty), temporal logic, deontic logic, doxastic
logic (belief), and so on.
2.2.3 Temporal logic
Temporal logic can be used to describe how the behaviours of systems unfold
over time. In [70], Pnueli suggested a unified approach to program verification for
sequential and parallel systems. The main proof methods suggested in this study
was that of temporal reasoning about systems. And then, Manna and Pnueli firstly
proposed the use of temporal logic for reasoning about the properties of reactive
systems [55]. This logic uses a set of atomic properties, Boolean connectives, and
four temporal operators. The temporal operators normally mean future operators:
invariant, eventually, next, and until. There are two different underlying structures
of time. The first one is Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [59], and the second one
is Computational Tree Logic (CTL) [71, 72]. The underlying structure of time in
the LTL is a totally ordered set. On the other hand, in the CTL the underlying
structure of time is branching tree-like as depicted in Figure 2.2.
The LTL uses four temporal operators: X (next), G (invariant), F (eventually),
and U (until), and the CTL uses the temporal operators above mentioned with two
path quantifiers: A (for all paths) and E (a path exists). Even though the CTL uses
the path quantifiers additionally, the expressive power of the CTL and LTL are not
comparable because there are the properties that can be expressed in the LTL but
cannot be expressed in the CTL, and vice versa. But there is a temporal logic, CTL*,
which is definitely more powerful than the CTL and LTL. It uses the temporal
operators of the LTL and the path quantifiers of the CTL, but differently from
the CTL its temporal operators can be used without path quantifiers. Therefore,
CTL can be viewed as a fragment of CTL*. There is another fragment of CTL*,
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Figure 2.2: Representations of LTL and CTL for a given transition system
Propositional Linear Temporal Logic (PLTL) [57]. PLTL [73] is a linear time logic
with past modalities Y (yesterday) and S (since). Because it does not use the
path quantifiers like LTL, it only deals with the set of executions and can not
examine alternative executions which split off from one state at each time step
where a nondeterministic choice is possible. Based on this original temporal logic,
Real-Time Temporal Logic (RTTL) is extended to apply automated verification to
real-time distributed systems for safety-critical applications [74, 75].
2.3 Model checker
2.3.1 Why model checking?
Model checking[59, 57] can explore all possible systems states in a brute-force
manner. In other words, model checking tool examines all possible system sce-
narios in a systematic manner and shows that a given system satisfies a certain
property. There are some advantages of model checking which induce industry an
increasing interest. Firstly, recently-developed model checking tools can handle
state spaces of about 108 to 109 states with explicit state-space enumeration and
larger state spaces up to 10476 states for specific problems using clever algorithms
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and tailored data structures. Moreover, model checking can reveal even the subtle
errors that may remain undiscovered by testing and simulation because they are
aimed at tracing the most probable defects. Additionally, the properties of interest
can be checked individually when model checking is used. Therefore, users can
focus on the essential properties at every phase of development. The autonomous
multi-agent systems dealt with in this thesis can be considered as prototype. They
are not fully-developed system and have potential to be extended. Hence, a ver-
ification tool for these systems must have ability to deal with increasing state
space. Moreover, it needs to discover any error that can be created from evolution
of system/specification and does not require complete specification in the initial
phase of study. Consequently, model checking is the most proper technique to
verify the systems in this study.
2.3.2 Deﬁnition and requirement of model checker
Model checking is an automated procedure that performs an exhaustive or sym-
bolic search of the system’s state-space and determines the truth value of the
specification in question, i.e., an automated formal methods. Moreover, the model
checking always terminates with a ‘true’ or ‘false’ answer and provides a coun-
terexample which can be used to check the system errors and to take corrective
actions. The algorithms used in model checking rely on the explicit construction
of the finite state model targeted for verification. When applied to finite state
systems, model checking can be performed automatically. In the case of complex
systems, such an approach rapidly leads to the state explosion problem. There-
fore, the principles underlying these model checking algorithms have evolved
continuously, based on the type of temporal logic used in the specification. Usu-
ally, model checking involves satisfying the never claims, where the aim is to show
that a (undesirable) specification (or condition) is never reached.
The model checking problem of a system involves the verification of certain
fundamental system properties: reachability, safety, liveness and fairness properties.
The details of each property follows as:.
• reachability property means that some particular property can be reached.
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• safety property represents that, under certain conditions, something never
occurs.
• liveness property means that, under certain conditions, something will ulti-
mately occur.
• fairness property implies that, under certain conditions, something will (or
will not) occur infinitely often.
Reachability is simple to express such as ‘the program can enter a critical section’
or ‘the program cannot reach the crash state.’ They can also be conditional like
‘critical section can be entered without n = 0’. Reachability may also apply to any
reachable state. LTL is poorly suited for specifying reachability properties because
it implicitly quantifies over all computation paths. Thus, LTL can only express
reachability negatively such as ‘something is not reachable’.
Safety conditions are generally of the form ‘both processes will not be in the
critical section simultaneously.’ In general, safety statements express that an un-
desirable event will not occur.
Examples of liveness include ‘any request will ultimately be satisfied’ or ‘the
program will terminate.’ As the terminology suggests, the general meaning of
the liveness property is to state that some event will occur in the end. From an
utilitarian point of view, the liveness property yields no information.
A classic fairness statement is the ‘if access to a critical section is infinitely
often requested, then access will be granted infinitely often.’ In practice, the fair-
ness properties are very often used to describe some form of non-deterministic
sequences, in particular when dealing with concurrent system [76]. Fairness
assumptions are requisite to establish liveness properties or other properties im-
plying that the system makes progress [59]. There are two different types of
fairness constraints: strong fairness and weak fairness. Strong fairness represents
that an activity infinitely often occurs, but is not necessarily always. In other
words there may be finite periods during which the activity does not occur. On
the other hands, weak fairness means that an activity continuously happens and
no period is allowed in which the activity does not happen.
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2.3.3 Model checking tools
Many researchers have used model checking to deal with finite state concurrent
systems, especially to verify hardware and software such as complex sequential
circuit designs and communication protocols [19]. Also, many automatic tools
for model checking, i.e., model checkers have been developed for a long time. As
examples of earlier model checkers, there are Simple Promela Interpreter (SPIN),
Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV/NuSMV), UPPAAL, KRONOS, HYTECH and so
on.
The SPIN is a model checker for the LTL and was developed for the verification
of protocols and software in the 1980s. As its programming language is PROcess
Meta Language (PROMELA), the user must translate the system of interest into
the PROMELA. The SPIN is known as a mature tool but cannot handle unbounded
data.
The SMV is one of the model checking tools using Ordered Binary Decision Di-
agrams (OBDD) and based on the model checking techniques for the CTL. NuSMV,
a re-implementation of SMV, applies the bounded model checking methods for
the LTL in addition to the OBDD for the CTL. In the same way as the SPIN, the
SMV and NuSMV need to translate the system into their own input languages.
Generally, these translations in the aforementioned tools require simplification or
abstraction of the systems, by which false counter-examples can be caused.
UPPAAL[77] is an integrated tool for modelling, simulating, and verifying
real-time systems. It is able to analyze networks of timed automata with binary
synchronization. The timed systems are described using graphical editor part and
then users can perform simulation of the systems and check the behaviour of the
designed systems using graphical simulator. At last, verifier check the reachability
properties of the systems.
KRONOS[78] is a model checker for the TCTL (Timed Computation Tree
Logic)properties of a timed automaton. The timed automaton can be given in
textual form starting from a system consisting of some components. After that,
KRONOS computes the automaton corresponding to the synchronized product.
HYTECH[79] is developed to analyze linear hybrid automata at Cornell Uni-
versity. A set of linear hybrid automata synchronized by some common transi-
tions can be used in HYTECH. It computes the subsets of the global state space
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from the automata in a textual form. Subsequently, the result of the computation
provides information about the behaviour of the system.
There are more recently evolved model checking tools. For instance, BLAST
[80] was developed to check the temporal safety properties of C programs au-
tomatically. It verifies a program by the following steps. Firstly, a program is
represented by using a set of control flow automata. And then BLAST constructs
an abstract reachability tree to present a portion of the reachable state space of
the program. Finally, it shows whether the error configuration is never reached
or not. BLAST was developed by the University of California and can be used to
prove the memory safety of C programs.
SLAM [81] verifies the temporal safety properties of Window APIs imple-
mented in the C programs. The analysis engine of the SLAM is SDV (Static Driver
Verifier) which checks whether a device driver correctly interacts with the Win-
dow operating system kernel or not. Its constructs a Boolean program which has
the same control-flow structure of the original C program but consists of only
Boolean variables. And then these Boolean variables track important predicates
over the states in the original program using the predicate abstraction technique
to perform reachability analysis and counter-example driven refinement.
Zing [82] is a framework for software model checking. This project aimed to
build a flexible and scalable model checking infrastructure for concurrent soft-
ware. It includes a modelling language, a state explorer, and an automatic model
generator from common programming languages such as Visual Basic, C/C++,
C#, and so on.
Java Path Finder [83] was started from the translation from Java to Promela.
Nowadays it is based on a Java Virtual Machine, which is a state software model
checker for Java. The same as other software model checker, it explores all
execution paths of a program and find violations of properties.
MAGIC [84] is another model checker that can be applied to C programs.
Its main task is to check the consistency between software specifications and
implementations.
There is one more model checker named as MCMAS[42]. The goal of the MC-
MAS is the development of formal verification techniques for multi-agent systems
using model checking techniques. The systems used in the MCMAS are deon-
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tic interpreted systems. For the purpose of specification of multi-agent systems,
CTLKD − AD,C formulae are used. The CTLKD − AD,C stands for Alternating-
time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) extended with the operators for correct
behaviour. It means that this multi-modal logic includes temporal, epistemic,
correct behavioural and strategic operators.
2.3.4 Selection of model checking tool: MCMAS
In this thesis, the MCMAS is adopted to verify a heterogeneous multi-agent
autonomous system because it is more suitable for multi-agent system than the
other tools and has no limitation of dealing with a large multi-agent system
composed of many autonomous agents. MCMAS [42] is based on OBDD and
uses its own language ISPL to describe deontic interpreted systems. OBDD is a
canonical graph of Boolean function and acquired by imposing an ordering on the
Boolean variables and reducing the graph of the Boolean function [85]. Originally,
binary decision diagrams were introduced by Lee [86], and further studied and
made known by Akers [87] and Boute [88]. Based on their studies, the full potential
for efficient algorithms derived from the data structure was introduced by Randal
Bryant. He suggested a fixed variable ordering for canonical representation and
shared sub-graphs for compression as above-mentioned[85, 89, 90].
An interpreted system which can be used in MCMAS is represented with a
tuple IS as follows.
IS =
〈
(Li, Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,··· ,A} , (LE, ActE, PE, tE) , I, V
〉
(2.1)
where A is the number of agents in the system and E represents Environment
Agent which can be used to describe the environment in which agents interact.
Li are local states of agent i, Acti represents a set of actions, and Pi and ti mean
protocols Pi : Li → 2Acti and evolution functions ti : Li × LE ×Act→ Li each, where
Act = Act1×· · ·×ActA×ActE. Additionally, I is a set of possible initial global states
and V is an evaluation relation, V ⊆ S×AP , in a given set of atomic propositions
AP. As described in the equation of evolution functions, evolution of one agent
is affected by not only its own local state and action but also local state and action
of Environment Agent and actions of the other agents. By this way, MCMAS can
PhD Thesis: Jiyoung Choi
∣∣∣ 21
Chapter 2. Model Checking-Background Knowledge
practice interactions among individual agents and environment to construct a
multi-agent system.
The ISPL has six essential parts to represent an above-described interpreted
system: Environment Agent, Agent, InitStates, Evaluation, and Formulae. In the
Agent parts including Environment Agent, a Kripke model can be constructed
using state variables, actions, protocols, and evolution. Possible worlds can be
defined as state variables, labelling function is described in protocol section using
properties defined as actions, and rules in evolution represent accessibility relation
among possible worlds. In the InitStates part, the initial states of all agents are
defined. Finally, the atomic propositions and their valid states are each declared
in the Evaluation part. Using these propositions, the properties which we want to
verify are expressed in the Formulae part.
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Surveillance Mission by a Single MAV
3.1 Scenario deﬁnition
To start with a simple multi-agent system, a part of decision making model used
in the MoD Grand Challenge1 is considered in this chapter. The Grand Challenge
was a competition to look for innovative ideas and the technology to solve the
military problem faced in a hostile urban environment. The scenario was that
the competitors were in command of a troop operating apart from them and the
troop made a reconnaissance to find threats. The competitors had already been
aware of potential danger points where the enemy may lie in ambush, but, there
were snipers, danger, and improvised explosive devices all around. Therefore,
they had to discover whether the hostile urban environment is safe or not finding
and removing hidden threats using intelligence graphic information gathered
from multiple joint and coalition sources such as satellite and manned/unmanned
aerial vehicle feeds. Figure 3.1 shows the town where the final demonstration
was set up [91].
Cranfield University participated in this project as a member of the Stellar team
and used the Kripke models to describe autonomous systems: Ground Control
System (GCS), Micro Aerial Vehicle (MAV), High-Level Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(HLUAV), and Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) which implemented missions
for the MoD Grand Challenge [47]. These integrated mixed vehicle systems
demonstrated by the Stellar team found targets with complete coverage and no
false alarms. Moreover, despite the bad weather, Stellar team detected system
failure and used their operators effectively during the search, so they could create
a clear and accurate report upon completion of the task. As a consequence, Stellar
team became the winner and won the RJ Mitchell Trophy as shown in Figure 3.2.
As an initial step, only the GCS and MAV are selected from the aforementioned
Grand Challenge scenario to abstract the decision making model from one of their
missions. An overview of the mission between the GCS and MAV is depicted in
1http://www.challenge.mod.uk
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Figure 3.1: Sky view of Copehill Down
Figure 3.2: The Stellar team in Grand Challenge
PhD Thesis: Jiyoung Choi
∣∣∣ 24
Chapter 3. Surveillance Mission by a Single MAV
Figure 3.3. The main mission of the MAV is to obtain images of potential threats.
For this, the MAV follows the waypoints commanded from the GCS, captures
the images and sends them back to the GCS. Then, the images obtained from the
MAV can be used for threat analysis, which decides whether each threat needs
to be verified further by the UGV. Moreover, the MAV will automatically land by
following safety requirement in cases: 1) the communication channel to the GCS
is lost, 2) the GCS sends a landing command.
Figure 3.3: The scenario overview of surveillance mission by a single MAV in perspective
of Grand Challenge mission
3.2 Kripke modelling of multi-agent system
3.2.1 Kripke model for MAV
The behaviours of the MAV can be defined as follows: launch, path-following,
capturing images, sending images, and land. However, in a real situation, it
is impossible for the MAV to transit from path-following to capturing/sending
images state because the MAV follows the waypoints capturing or sending images
simultaneously. Therefore, the behaviours performed in the same time need to
be integrated to construct a correct Kripke model. Figure 3.4 shows the modified
Kripke model for the MAV. In the state of the path-following the MAV performs
a waypoint following manoeuvre, captures the target images and sends them to
the GCS.
The accessibility relations are described as follows:
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Figure 3.4: Kripke model for the MAV
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the MAV receives the launching com-
mand.
r1 =
 true if the MAV receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the MAV has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if the MAV has been launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The MAV follows the waypoints, captures and sends the target
images to the GCS in normal situation.
r3 =

true if the MAV performs path-following
and its mission successfully.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the MAV needs to land.
r4 =

true if the GCS sends the landing command
or communication is lost.
f alse otherwise
3.2.2 Kripke model for GCS
To construct the Kripke model for the GCS, the behaviours of the GCS related
with MAV mission can be defined as the following states: launch-commanding,
waypoint-sending, threat analysis, path-planning, and land-commanding. In the
path planning state, the GCS calculates the next waypoint that the MAV has to
visit.
The transitions among the states can be described in detail:
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Figure 3.5: Kripke model for the GCS
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the GCS sends the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the MAV sends the threat images.
r2 =
 true if the GCS receives the threat images from the MAV.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the GCS has finished threat analysis.
r3 =
 true if the GCS has finished threat analysis.f alse otherwise
• (W4 −W2): The transition happens if the GCS has finished path-planning.
r4 =
 true if the GCS has finished the calculation of new waypoints.f alse otherwise
• (W1−W5),(W2−W5),(W3−W5),(W4−W5): The transition happens if the GCS
has decided to command landing to the MAV.
r5, r6, r7, r8 =

true if the GCS sends the landing command to the MAV
because of the emergency or mission completion.
f alse otherwise
3.3 Modelling of properties to be veriﬁed
There are two properties to be verified in this scenario. The first property is ‘The
MAV must land or stay at standby state if the GCS sends the landing command or the
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communication channel is lost.’ This is an important property in unmanned systems
by the safety requirement. The second property to be verified is ‘The MAV must
be launched if the GCS sends the launching command successfully.’ This property is
defined to check whether the MAV follows the command from the GCS correctly
or not. These properties can be expressed in CTL as follows.
AG(((GCS.state = LC) ∨ (Environment.state = LO))
→ AX((MAV.state = SB) ∨ (MAV.state = LA))) (3.1)
AG(((GCS.state = CL) ∧ (Environment.state = CO))
→ AX((MAV.state = L))) (3.2)
where ‘LC’ and ‘CL’ mean Command to Land and Command to Launch states of the
GCS, respectively. Similarly ‘SB’, ‘L’, and ‘LA’ represent Standby, Launched, and
Land states of the MAV. The states related with the state of communication are
represented by ‘LO’, Communication Lost, and ‘CO’, Communicating.
3.4 Model checking with MCMAS
3.4.1 MCMAS model
Figure 3.6: The elements of MCMAS model in Section 3.4.1
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To perform the model checking automatically, the decision making behaviours
of multi-agent system described in Section 3.2 are translated into ISPL, the input
language of MCMAS. Figure 3.6 depicts the elements of the ISPL for the verifica-
tion.
Figure 3.7 shows the entire ISPL code which represents all Agents, initial states
of each agents, Evaluation, and Formulae. Environment Agent is constructed to rep-
resent the states of communication between the GCS and MAV. It has two states,
communicating and lost, and available actions, send/receive and none. The Kripke
models of the GCS and MAV are represented in Agent part by means of interpreted
system formulation explained in Section 2.3.4. The Agent GCS consists of five
states as described in the Kripke model: launch-commanding state, waypoint-
sending state, threat analysis state, path-planning state, and land-commanding
state. Each state has an action equivalent to their state and, additionally, com-
manding landing action for emergency. The states of the MAV in Agent MAV are
standby state, launch state, path-following state, and land state. The standby state,
launch state, and land state have only one action respectively which means state
completion. While the path following state has three different actions: waypoints
following, sending images to the GCS, and landing. As explained in Section 2.3.4,
Evolution parts of Agent GCS and Agent MAVshow that all evolution of individ-
ual agent are established under interactions of locals and actions possessed by
every agents and environment at that phase. To help to find the interaction part
in Evolution, local states and actions of environment and the other agent used
for each agent’s evolution are marked with yellow line in Figure 3.7. The proper-
ties discussed in Section 3.3 are described in Formulae as CTL expression and the
atomic propositions used to describe these properties are defined in Evaluation.
The initial states of the GCS and MAV are declared as launch-commanding state
and standby state respectively as depicted in each Kripke model. In case of Agent
Environment, communicating is assigned as the initial state for the nominal state
of environment.
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Figure 3.7: ISPL code used for this chapter
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3.4.2 Veriﬁcation results
The properties described in Section 3.3 are verified by means of MCMAS model
checking command, and the results of them are shown in Figure 3.8
Figure 3.8: Verification results
Equation 3.1 has been verified as ‘true’, but Equation 3.2 has ‘false’ result. Using
the counterexample/witness option, an error trace can be acquired and discussed
in the next section.
3.4.3 Analysis and discussion
Figure 3.9: The counterexample of formula 2
Formula 2 is defined to check whether the MAV follows the command from
the GCS correctly or not. Therefore, the MAV must be launched if the GCS
sends the launching command successfully by designer’s intention. However, the
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verification result of formula 2 represents that this property is violated in some
branch of the computational tree. The counterexample shows the case in which
the communication has been lost after the GCS sent the launching command. In
this situation, the MAV can not receive the command and can not help staying
at the standby state. That is, the MAV can not launch because the GCS sent
the launching command successfully but this command has not been sent to the
MAV. This case has not yet been considered the stage of property modelling. In
this scenario, communication between the agents is the most important part to
perform cooperation correctly. Through the communication, agents share the
information of targets, and transmit the command and waypoints. Therefore
it is essential not only for mission execution but also for safety. However, the
counterexample illustrated in Figure 3.9 showed that the mission cannot even be
started when the communication has been lost. In real world, there is no almighty
solution against communication loss. If communication between remote agents
from each other is lost, the only option which they can take is to return to a base
safely. Therefore, an interruption of mission execution by communication loss
can not be conquered. Another possible case causing the interruption of mission
completion is irrecoverable malfunction of agents. If agents have problems such
as mechanical fault, disorder of electrical devices, or false of main controller and
these problems can not be repaired for themselves, missions can not be executed
any longer, either. Accordingly, the only alternatives for improving the probability
of mission success are to use an additional agent or redundant communication
channels.
3.5 Extended scenario deﬁnition
As a result of discussion in Section 3.4.3, the scenario is extended as follows: If
the MAV malfunctions in the path following state, the GCS commands the MAV
to land and a new MAV to launch. Then the new MAV performs the mission as
a substitute for the old MAV. The extended model cannot solve the problem of
communication loss basically, however, it can certainly improve the probability
of mission completion. To construct the modified scenario the Kripke models of
the GCS and MAV have to be changed with additional states.
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3.6 Kripke modelling of extended scenario
3.6.1 Kripke model for MAV and substitute MAV
The new behaviour of the MAV aims to overcome malfunction during performing
the mission. Figure 3.10 shows the modified Kripke model for the MAV and the
substitute MAV.
Figure 3.10: Kripke model for the MAV and the substitute MAV
The additional accessibility relations are described below:
• (W3−W5): The transition happens if the MAV detects its malfunction during
path-following.
r5 =
 true if the MAV detects its malfunction during the mission.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W4): The transition happens if the GCS commands to land because of
malfunction.
r6 =
 true if the GCS commands to land because of malfunction.f alse otherwise
3.6.2 Kripke model for GCS with additional behaviour
To combine the replacement behaviour into the original Kripke model for the
GCS, the replacement state is added as depicted in Figure 3.11.
The additional accessibility relations are as follows:
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Figure 3.11: Kripke model for the GCS with replacement behaviour
• (W5−W6): The transition happens if the MAV malfunctions during the path-
following mission.
r9 =
 true if the MAV malfunctions during the mission.f alse otherwise
• (W6−W2): The transition happens if the GCS commands the replacement of
the MAV.
r10 =
 true if the GCS commands the substitute MAV to launch.f alse otherwise
3.7 Property modelling of extended scenario
Three properties are specified to verify whether the replacement behaviour on the
MAV is performed correctly or not. They can be expressed in CTL and interpreted
as follows.
AX((MAV.state = MAL)→ (GCS.state = REP)) (3.3)
which means ‘If the MAV malfunctions, the GCS replaces it by the substitute MAV’ for
the replacement mission.
AG(!((MAV.state = PF) and (subMAV.state = PF))) (3.4)
which means ‘The MAV and the substitute MAV cannot fly simultaneously’ for the
safety reason. Since this scenario assumes the path-planning is possible to be
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designed only for one vehicle, two vehicles cannot perform the mission together.
AX((MAV.state = MAL)→ (subMAV.state = PF)) (3.5)
This formula represents ‘The subMAV will be launched only after the MAV malfunc-
tions.’
3.8 Model checking of extended scenario
3.8.1 MCMAS model
To reflect the changed Kripke models, the ISPL code has been modified in Agent,
Evaluation, InitStates, and Formulae parts. The replacement state is added in the
Agent GCS, and additional action/protocol and evolution functions related with
the replacement state are attached. Same as the GCS, the modified Agent MAV
has the malfunction state, action and arisen evolution functions additionally.
Moreover the Agent subMAV has the same states, actions, and protocols, but
evolution function because it has to be launched in case the GCS decides to
execute replacement.
3.8.2 Veriﬁcation results
MCMAS verifies the properties mentioned in Section 3.7, and the results of them
are shown in Figure 3.12. All the results are ‘true’, which mean that the modified
scenario for the replacement of faulty MAV is constructed successfully. Firstly,
the GCS successfully decides to perform replacement of the MAV when it mal-
functions. The substitute MAV is also launched only after the MAV malfunctions.
Moreover, the result of formula 2 certifies that two MAVs do not fly simultane-
ously. This means there is no probability of collision between two MAVs.
3.8.3 Analysis and discussion
The system described in Section 3.1 was extended to include one more agent to
improve the probability of mission completion. Furthermore, the modified system
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Figure 3.12: Verification result of modified scenario
was modelled as the Kripke model easily on the base of the previous model and
checked to prove the correct behaviour. The results of Equation 3.3 and 3.5 mean
that if the MAV informs its fault, the GCS re-plans the mission scenario and the
substitute MAV takes over the mission of the previous MAV successfully. These
results perfectly accord with the design intention. Hereby, the probability of
mission success can increase. Moreover, by checking the property described in
Equation 3.4, it is clearly proved that the MAV and the substitute MAV do not fly
simultaneously. This result also means that the additional behaviour of the multi-
agent system does not violate the safety requirement. As mentioned in Section
3.7, this scenario assumed to perform path-planning for only one vehicle. If two
MAVs fly simultaneously, and what is worse, one of them is faulty, a collision of
two MAVs probably happens because they use or used same path according to
the path-planning by the GCS. Therefore, formula 2 is very important for safety
and its verification result fully satisfies the requirement.
The extension of the scenario in this chapter shows the feasibility of model
checking process in the design level of a multi-agent system. By this way, a
designer can find an unanticipated situation, which can not be easily found in
a simulation, without a real test. Moreover, the result of this chapter showed
that the modified system can be re-modelled and verified with less effort. In
the following chapters, this strength of model checking will be explored more in
detail with taking realistic complex scenarios into account.
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4.1 Scenario deﬁnition
The scenario used in this and subsequent chapters is referred from Exemplar 2
of the scenario candidates provided by SEAS DTC (Systems Engineering for Au-
tonomous Systems Defence Technology Centre), UK [92]. Figure 4.1 depicts an
overview of the mission scenario. The UAV airborne convoys UGV moving on
the ground whose mission commanded by the GCS is to transport the resources
towards the destination, e.g. a friendly military base in the battlefield. The UAV
follows the predefined waypoints, captures the images along the route the UGV
moves on and sends them back to the GCS until the UGV arrives at the desti-
nation. The main roles of the GCS are to analyze the images captured by the
UAV and to re-plan the mission if necessary. There are some events which could
potentially deter the mission completion: encountering with a GPS-denying area,
a damaged route including roads or bridges, an intermittent communication loss,
and pop-up threats on the ground. Each event directly affects the state transi-
tion of the agents by the decision making algorithms. However, the transition
due to communication loss is different from the others. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.4.3, the communication loss can result in the termination of the mission.
However, in a real battlefield, there might be an intermittent communication loss
due to electro-magnetic interference, loss of line-of-sight, or enemy’s jamming.
Since the mission is not seriously interrupted by the intermittent communication
loss, therefore, a distinction between intermittent and permanent communication
losses is required to maximize the mission completion. In this scenario, the con-
cept of confirmation time is applied for this distinction. The confirmation time is
a threshold of accumulated time. If some event has been detected continuously
for the predefined confirmation time, then an observer can declare an occurrence
of the event. Generally, this concept is widely used to discriminate correct fault
detection from false alarm [93].
PhD Thesis: Jiyoung Choi
∣∣∣ 37
Chapter 4. Convoy Mission by Single UAV and Single UGV
Figure 4.1: Convoy mission using single UAV and single UGV
4.2 Kripke modelling of multi-agent system
4.2.1 Kripke model for UAV
In the case of the UAV, the Kripke model is same as that of the MAV in Section
3.2.1. There are four possible worlds: standby, launch, path-following, and land.
As mentioned before, because the behaviour of capturing and sending images
is performed while the UAV follows the path, there is no state which represents
capturing and sending the images additionally.
Figure 4.2: Kripke model for the UAV
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The possible worlds and accessibility relations are as follows.
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the UAV receives the launching com-
mand.
r1 =
 true if the UAV receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the UAV has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if the UAV has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if the UAV performs the path-following.
r3 =
 true if the UAV performs the path-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3−W4): The transition happens if the UAV receives the landing command
or the communication loss is confirmed.
r4 =

true if the UAV receives the landing command
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
4.2.2 Kripke model for UGV
There are seven possible worlds for the UGV with the following decision-making
behaviours: ready, dispatched, path-following, obstacle avoidance, standby, go
to the designated point, and arrive. The state of obstacle avoidance is considered
due to pop-up threats on the route. Furthermore, differently from the UAV, the
standby state is included because the UGV can stop moving when the GCS re-
plans the mission. Similarly the state in which the UGV goes to the designated
point is considered for the case of encountering with a GPS denying area and an
intermittent communications loss. Figure 4.3 shows these possible worlds and their
accessibility relations.
The accessibility relations are as follows in detail:
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the UGV receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
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Figure 4.3: Kripke model for the UGV
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the UGV has been dispatched success-
fully.
r2 =
 true if the UGV has been dispatched.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The UGV keeps on the path-following state until it arrives at the
destination unless there is a special event.
r3 =
 true if nothing happens and the mission keeps going on.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the pop-up threats appear.
r4 =
 true if the pop-up threats appear.f alse otherwise
• (W4 − W3): The transition happens if the UGV has avoided the threats
successfully.
r5 =
 true if the UGV has avoided the threats.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if the main route has been damaged or
the communication loss has been confirmed.
r6 =

true if the route has been damaged
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
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• (W5 −W3): The transition happens if the GCS re-plans the route.
r7 =
 true if the GCS re-plans the route.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W6): The transition happens if the UGV enters the GPS denial zone or
an intermittent communication disorder happens.
r8 =

true if the UGV enters the GPS denial zone
or an intermittent communication disorder happens.
f alse otherwise
• (W6 −W3): The transition happens if the UGV gets out of the GPS denial
zone and the communication has been restored.
r9 =

true if the UGV gets out of the GPS denial zone
and the communication has been restored.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W7): The mission has been completed if the UGV arrives at the desti-
nation.
r10 =
 true if the UGV arrives at the destinationf alse otherwise
4.2.3 Kripke model for GCS
The possible worlds of the GCS related with decision-making behaviours are de-
fined as four states: command to launch, image analysis, re-planning, and com-
mand to land. These possible worlds and their accessibility relations are represented
graphically in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Kripke model for the GCS
The accessibility relations are as follows in detail:
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• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the GCS sends the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W2): The state maintains if the GCS performs the image analysis.
r2 =
 true if the GCS performs the image analysis.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the GCS decides the re-planning.
r3 =

true if the GCS decides the re-planning
because of GPS denial or damaged route.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W2): The transition happens if the GCS has finished the re-planning.
r4 =
 true if the GCS has finished the re-planning.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W4): The transition happens if the mission has been completed or the
communication loss is confirmed.
r5 =

true if the mission has been completed
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
4.3 Modelling of properties to be veriﬁed
To check whether the decision-making behaviours among the agents are modelled
properly, six properties related with decision-making behaviours are specified as
follows.
AG((Environment.trigger = 1)→ AX(UAV.state = SB∨UAV.state = Land)) (4.1)
which means ‘If the communication loss is confirmed, namely, the state of communication
loss continues for three sequences, the UAV must land.’ In Section 4.2.1, the UAV
executes launch when it has healthy communication state and to land when it
loses communication permanently for safety reason. This formula is adopted to
check whether this decision making algorithm of the UAV is executed accurately.
AG((Environment.trigger = 1)→ AX(!(UGV.state = PF))) (4.2)
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Same as the UAV, the UGV is planned to stop following the route when the
communication loss is confirmed. The second formula is for verification of this
behaviour.
AG((Environment.state = Comm_Lost)→ AX(UAV.state = Land)) (4.3)
which represents ‘If the communication is lost, the UAV must land ’ and contradicts
the first property. Because the UAV is designed not to land by encountering the
communication loss unless the communication loss has been confirmed. This
property is defined to assure that there is no false decision making behaviour
related with an intermittent communication disorder. The fourth property to be
verified is that ‘If the UGV comes into the GPS denial zone it must get out of the area and
return to the previous point in which the GPS signal was valid’ and can be expressed
in CTL as follow.
AG((Environment.state = GPS_den)∧(UGV.state = PF)→ AX(UGV.state = GotoP))
(4.4)
The fifth property is that ‘If the UGV faces with the pop-up threats, then it performs
obstacle avoidance maneouvre’
AG((Environment.state = Popup)∧(UGV.state = PF)→ AX(UGV.state = ObsAvoid))
(4.5)
The last property to be checked in this scenario is as follows.
AG((Environment.state = Route_dam)
→ AX((GCS.state = Replan) ∨ (GCS.state = Com_land))) (4.6)
which states ‘If the route is damaged the GCS must re-plan or end the mission.’ The
latter three properties are all related with possible events in the environment and
aimed to examine the correct behaviour of agents.
4.4 Model checking with MCMAS
4.4.1 MCMAS model
In this scenario, four agents are used to construct a multi-agent system in the
battlefield. First of all, the events mentioned in Section 4.1 are described in
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the Environment Agent part. Five variables representing the events are None,
Comm_lost, GPS_den, Route_dam, and Popup. None means ‘no event happens’,
Comm_lost means ‘communication is lost’, GPS_den represents ‘the UGV is in
a GPS denial zone’, Route_dam represents ‘the route is damaged’, and Popup
means ‘the UGV encounters with pop-up threats.’ GPS_den, Route_dam, and Popup
directly affect the transition between states of the GCS and UGV as described in
Section 4.2.3 and 4.2.2. The transition due to Comm_lost is different as explained
in Section 4.1. Three temporary variables are used to save the past event for three
sequences and a trigger variable is set up to represent that the communication
loss is confirmed. The trigger variable turns to ‘1’ from ‘0’ when three temporary
variables are all Comm_lost. The other agents consist the GCS, UAV, and UGV.
Each has the states which represent possible worlds and the evolution rules which
represent accessibility relations described in Section 4.2.
4.4.2 Veriﬁcation result
The result of verification is shown in Figure 4.5. Differently from the other results,
the result of formula 3 has to be ‘false’ because the UAV must keep going on its
behaviour against an intermittent communication loss until the communication
loss is confirmed as explained in Section 4.3. Therefore, the result ‘true’ of formula
1, 2, and ‘false’ of formula 3 imply the decision making behaviours of the UAV
related with communication loss are executed properly according to the confir-
mation logic. Formulae 4 and 5 acquire the result ‘true’ as well, which shows
the decision making behaviours of the UGV related with entering the GPS denial
zone or encountering with the obstacle are performed correctly. From the last
result, it is verified that the decision making behaviour of re-planning mission is
successfully performed in the case of the event encountering with the damaged
route.
4.4.3 Analysis and discussion
The scenario dealt with in this chapter can be regarded as the result of reflec-
tion from the previous chapter. In the previous chapter, MCMAS found the
unexpected situation in which the MAV can not even start its mission due to com-
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Figure 4.5: Verification Result
munication loss. Then, the multi-agent system was improved with the substitute
MAV for mission completion. In this chapter, the other alternative is adopted for
the mission completion. That is, the decision making algorithms linked with the
communication loss are reinforced to accommodate more realistic scenarios by
using the concept of confirmation time. The UAV and UGV used in this chapter
do not take an action of mission termination such as Land against an intermittent
communication loss until communication loss has been confirmed by confirma-
tion time. These behaviours are successfully verified by MCMAS as described in
Section 4.4.2. In addition to the reinforced communication problem, the scenario
considers the other possible events in battlefield, which can deter the execution
of the mission. To cope with these events, proper behaviours of the agents are de-
signed such as re-planning and obstacle avoidance. The result of the formula 4-6
shows that these decision-making behaviours are also successfully constructed by
design purpose. As a result, the convoy scenario can be estimated prosperously
improving the mission success and well reflecting reality.
This enhanced system results in more interactive verifiable multi-agent system
even though the number of agents in this chapter is three, equivalent to that of
the previous chapter. Figure 4.6 depicts the Binary Decision Diagrams (BDD)
information of the modified system in Section 3.5 and the system used in this
chapter. The most valuable factor to be compared is the number of reachable
states. As shown in the figure, the number of reachable states was increased from
seventy five to three thousand, three hundred and eleven: approximately forty
four times increase. However, the execution time is maintained as milliseconds.
Moreover, the usages of memory are both around six/seven mega bytes. All
the verification processes using MCMAS have been performed on Intel Core2
Duo 2.4GHz with 1.95GB of RAM running Windows XP. Taking this specification
into consideration, the BDD information of two scenarios can be interpreted that
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MCMAS has an ability to deal with a large sized system very efficiently with a
reasonable computation requirement. This inference will be further investigated
in the following chapters using bigger and more complex multi-agent system.
(a) The result of Chapter 3 (b) The result of Chapter 4
Figure 4.6: Comparision of BDD information
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5.1 Scenario deﬁnition
The MCMAS manifested the feasibility for verification of multi-agent systems
which have more than three agents through the result in Chapter 4. Accordingly,
the system explored in this chapter will be expanded to include double agents
and to take into account multiple-subagent behaviours such as taking over the
duty between them. Fig. 5.1 depicts an overview of the enlarged system. The
single airborne agent is changed to two UAVs which perform different missions,
and the ground agent extends to have four members which behave with a leader-
follower logic. UAV 1 flies along the main route capturing/sending the images
like the single UAV used in the previous scenario. The UAV 2 convoys the UGV
locally and can take over the mission of the UAV 1 when it malfunctions. The
group of UGVs consist of head, middle 1, middle 2, and tail. The decision making
behaviour of the head is totally the same as that of the UGV described in the
previous chapter. However, the others change their states in accordance with the
decision making of the leader. The events which were considered in the previous
chapter are applied to this scenario as well including the distinction logic between
intermittent and permanent communication losses.
5.2 Kripke modelling of multi-agent system
5.2.1 Kripke model for UAV 1
In the case of UAV 1, the Kipke model is similar to that of the UAV in Chapter
4, but the additional fault state need to be defined as shown in Figure 5.2. To
establish the behaviour of taking over the mission within the group of UAVs, it
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Figure 5.1: Extended system with a group of UAVs and UGVs
is assumed that UAV 1 has capability to detect its malfunctions for itself by using
fault detection and diagnosis techniques.
Figure 5.2: Kripke model for UAV 1
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if UAV 1 receives the launching command.
r1 =
 true if UAV 1 receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
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• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 1 has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if UAV 1 has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 1 performs the path-following.
r3 =
 true if UAV 1 performs the path-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if UAV 1 receives the landing command
or the communication loss is confirmed.
r4 =

true if UAV 1 receives the landing command
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if UAV 1 self-detects its malfunctions.
r5 =
 true if UAV 1 detects its malfunctions.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W4): UAV 1 lands if it is faulty.
r6 =
 true if UAV 1 is faulty.f alse otherwise
5.2.2 Kripke model for UAV 2
UAV 2 has five possible worlds in the Kripke model: standby, launch, vehicle-
following, land, and path-following as depicted in Figure 5.3. In this scenario,
UAV 2 is designed to take over the mission of path monitoring when UAV 1 detects
its malfunctions. For this, UAV 2 has the states of executing two different missions.
The accessibility relations among possible worlds are represented as follows.
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the head UGV is dispatched.
r1 =
 true if the head UGV is dispatched.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if UAV 2 has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
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Figure 5.3: Kripke model for UAV 2
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 performs its mission without
any problem.
r3 =
 true if UAV 2 performs the vehicle-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4, W5 −W4): The transition happens if UAV 2 receives the landing
command, the UGVs have arrived, or the communication loss is confirmed.
r4, r7 =

true if UAV 2 receives the landing command
, the UGVs have arrived,
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.
r5 =
 true if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W5): The UAV 2 performs the path-following until it lands.
r6 =
 true if UAV 2 keeps performing the path-following.f alse otherwise
5.2.3 Kripke model for UGV
Figure 5.4 represents the Kripke model of the UGV. The Kripke model for the UGVs
has the same possible worlds of the UGV modelled in Chapter 4 as follows: ready,
dispatched, path-following, obstacle avoidance, standby, go to the designated
point, and arrive. The accessibility relations of the head UGV and the previous
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Figure 5.4: Kripke model for the UGV
UGV in Section 4.2.2 are also alike. However, because the other UGVs follow the
transition of the leader, their accessibility relations have to be modified as follows.
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the head UGV has been dispatched.
r1 =
 true if the head UGV has been dispatched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the UGVs have been dispatched suc-
cessfully.
r2 =
 true if the UGVs have been dispatched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The UGVs keep on path-following until it arrives at the destina-
tion unless there is a special event.
r3 =
 true if nothing happens and the mission keeps going on.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the pop-up threats appear.
r4 =
 true if the pop-up threats appear.f alse otherwise
• (W4 − W3): The transition happens if the UGV has avoided the threats
successfully.
r5 =
 true if the UGV has avoided the threats.f alse otherwise
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• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if the head UGV turns to the standby
state.
r6 =
 true if the head UGV turns to the standby state.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W3): The transition happens if the GCS re-plans the route.
r7 =
 true if the GCS re-plans the route.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W6): The transition happens if the head UGV goes to the designated
point.
r8 =
 true if the head UGV goes to the designated point.f alse otherwise
• (W6−W3): The transition happens if the head UGV get out of the GPS denial
zone and the communication has been restored.
r9 =

true if the head UGV get out of the GPS denial zone
and the communication has been restored.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W7): The mission has been completed if the head UGV arrives at the
destination.
r10 =
 true if the head UGV arrives at the destination.f alse otherwise
5.2.4 Kripke model for GCS
The Kripke model of the GCS does not need to be modified from the previous
model in Section 4.2.3. Therefore, the details of accessibility relations are omitted.
5.3 Modelling of properties to be veriﬁed
To inspect if the extended scenario is constructed correctly and does not break the
decision making algorithms which were verified formerly, the same properties in
Section 4.3 are taken into account again. In addition to them, five more properties
are appended to examine the correct behaviour among the group of UAVs/UGVs.
AG((UAVugv.state = V f ollowing ∧UAVpath.state = Falut
∧ !Environment.trigger = 1)→ AX(UAVugv.state = P f ollowing)) (5.1)
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AG(UGVhead.state = Standby→ AX(UGVtail.state = Standby)) (5.2)
AG(!UGVtail.state = Arrive→!UAVugv.state = Land) (5.3)
AF(UGVtail.state = Arrive→ (UAVpath.state = Land∧UAVugv.state = Land) (5.4)
AF(UGVhead.state = Arrive→ UGVtail.state = Arrive) (5.5)
The first added property is that ‘If UAV 1 malfunctions while UAV 2 is monitoring the
UGVs with healthy communication, then UAV 2 must take over the mission of UAV 1.’
By checking this property, completion of the substitution mission in the air can be
proved. In the group of the UGVs, the leader-follower logic must be investigated
similarly to the UAV. For that reason, the property which means ‘If the UGV head
turns to the standby state, then the UGV tail must turn to the standby state.’ will be
verified by the MCMAS as represented in Equation 5.2. The next property is that
‘If the UGV tail has not arrived, then UAV 2 must not land.’ It is related with the safety
property because the main role of UAV 2 is to monitor the group of the UGVs for
their safety. Therefore, UAV 2 must land after the convoy of the UGVs arrives at
the destination securely. In addition to the former property, the property related
with mission termination will be verified as well. The most important mission in
this scenario is to transfer the resources to the destination by the UGVs. Hence, if
the UGVs completes the main mission, the group of UAVs must terminate their
supporting mission. This property can be illustrated as ‘If the UGV tail has arrived,
then UAV 1 and 2 must land at last.’ ‘If the UGV head has arrived, the UGV tail must
arrive at last.’ is the last property in this scenario. This property is modelled to
investigate the functionality of the leader-follower logic among the UGVs as well.
5.4 Model checking with MCMAS
5.4.1 MCMAS model
Based on the MCMAS model in Section 4.4.1 the fault state of UAV 1, Agent
UAV 2, and three UGVs are added for this new MCMAS model. Moreover, a
Fairness section is supplemented from this scenario. This section contains Boolean
expressions which must be ‘true’ infinitely often along all executions. In this
scenario, intuitively, it is required that the battlefield has no event infinitely often.
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Therefore the proposition related with the state of Agent Environment is written in
the Fairness section as follow.
Environment.event = None (5.6)
5.4.2 Veriﬁcation results
As shown in Figure 5.5 formula 1-6 have same result of the previous chapter. All
the agents distinguished an intermittent communication loss from a permanent
communication loss correctly and made proper decisions against with the special
events. The result of formula 7 shows that the behaviour of taking over mission
between UAV 1 and UAV 2 is executed successfully. Similar to this, the ‘true’
results of formulas 8 and 11 stand for the correct execution of the decision-making
algorithms among the UGVs by the leader-follower logic. As explained in Section
5.3, formula 10 aims to check the proper mission termination, and the ‘true’ result
proves that. The result which can not be accepted intuitively is that of formula
9. Using the counterexample option, the execution trace in which property 9 is
broken is analyzed in the next section.
Figure 5.5: Verification Result
5.4.3 Analysis and discussion
The verification results of formulas 1-6 are not changed though the scenario has
been extended. It demonstrates that the extension of the multi-agent system
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does not frustrate the correct behaviours of the agents as expected in the design
level. Because the addition of agents in the MCMAS model is almost like that
of a plug and play device, an extension of a multi-agent system hardly violates
basic properties. The ‘true’ results of formulas 7, 8, and 11 assure the proper
behaviours of the additional agents in groups of UAV and UGV, respectively.
On the other hand, formula 10 represents the appropriate decision-making by a
relation between the UAVs and the UGVs. The main mission of the UAVs is to
convoy the group of UGVs unitl they arrive at the destination. Therefore, if the
UGVs arrive at the destination, i.e., they achieve their goal, the mission of UAVs
is completed as well. For the proper termination of the mission, the UAVs have to
finish their flight when the tail UGV informs its arrival. Using MCMAS, all these
behaviours are ascertained that they are performed correctly as designed.
Figure 5.6: Counterexample of formula 9
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There is one suspicious result of the verification, formula 9. As depicted in
Figure 5.6, UAV 2 lands because communication loss is confirmed. For the safety
reason, all the agents terminate the mission when they do not have valid com-
munication channels. Therefore, in the counterexample, not only UAV 2 but also
UAV 1 and the other UGVs are not performing the mission, either. Consequently,
the safety property which was designed in the property modelling is not proved
as ‘true’, but the counterexample stresses that all the agents are still safe. This
counterexample derives importance of the priority among the properties in a de-
sign level. Specifically, UAV 2 must keep executing the monitoring mission for the
safety of the UGVs but must interrupt it in emergency. That is to say, the property
related with the safety for itself is more important than the property related with
the safety for the other agent. The problem about the priority of the property
is mentioned in the other research and is accompanied by not only unmanned
systems but also manned systems [94].
The number of reachable states has been increased as much as five times
compared with that of the previous chapter as shown in Figure 5.7. It is anticipated
that this happened because the number of agents increased as many as more that
two times. However, despite of this, the execution time is quite short and the
memory used is ten mega bytes. It means that the CPU and RAM still have
roomy capacity to deal with the verification of multi-agent systems with larger
size. Because the extension of the number of agents has already been considered,
more complex interaction within the agents will be dealt with in the following
chapters. For example, each agent can have more states to represent more defined
systems, in other words, to represent a higher level of granularity in the system.
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Figure 5.7: BDD information of verification result
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Convoy mission by a group of UAVs
and UGVs including fault problem
6.1 Scenario deﬁnition
Generally speaking, homogeneous multiple agents are considered to construct a
redundant system. In this kind of system inclusive of redundancy, more than
one agent executes the same task simultaneously to improve mission completion.
Therefore, even though one of the multiple agents or more than one in a bigger
system becomes faulty, the other agents can keep on performing the mission
until achieving their ultimate goal. In this background, the scenario in Chapter 5
extends to include a fault-tolerant capability. First of all, the UGVs have the fault
state individually like UAV 1. Then the mid 1, mid 2, and tail UGV are set to make
their own decisions independently, i.e., their rules of behaviour are changed to
a decentralized configuration from a leader-follower method. Consequently, the
group of UGVs can be regarded as a redundant system to accomplish the convoy
mission. Because UAV 2 already performs a role of redundancy for UAV 1, only
the fault state is considered additionally.
6.2 Kripke modelling of multi-agent system
6.2.1 Kripke model for UAV 1
As described in Section 6.1, there is no modification from the previous model in
the behaviours of UAV 1. Therefore, the Kripke model of UAV 1 is the same as
the model in Section 5.2.1.
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6.2.2 Kripke model for UAV 2
UAV 2 is planned to include the fault state in this scenario. Figure 6.1 represnts
the reinforced Kripke model of UAV 2. The fault diagnosis is assumed to be done
by itself.
Figure 6.1: Kripke model for UAV 2
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the head UGV is dispatched.
r1 =
 true if the head UGV is dispatched.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if UAV 2 has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 performs its mission without
any problem.
r3 =
 true if UAV 2 performs the vehicle-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4, W5 −W4): The transition happens if UAV 2 receives the landing
command, the UGVs have arrived, or the communication loss is confirmed.
r4, r7 =

true if UAV 2 receives the landing command
, the UGVs have arrived,
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
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• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.
r5 =
 true if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W5): UAV 2 performs the path-following until it lands.
r6 =
 true if UAV 2 keeps performing the path-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W6, W5 −W6): The transition happens if UAV 2 self-detects its mal-
functions.
r8, r9 =
 true if UAV 2 detects its malfunctions.f alse otherwise
• (W6 −W4): UAV 2 lands if it is faulty.
r10 =
 true if UAV 2 is faulty.f alse otherwise
6.2.3 Kripke model for UGVs
Figure 6.2: Kripke model for the UGV
Similarly to UAV 2, the Kripke model for UGVs has just one more state, the
fault state, compared to the Kripke model in Chapter 5 as illustrated in Figure 6.2.
The accessibility relations in Section 4.2.2 are the basis of the accessibility relations of
the UGVs in this scenario, but the additional accessibility relations from the fault
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state are considered. Moreover, to take account of realistic arrivals of the UGVs,
different conditions are applied to the individual UGV for transition to the arrive
state. These modifications are described as follows.
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the UGV receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the UGV has been dispatched success-
fully.
r2 =
 true if the UGV has been dispatched.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The UGV keeps on the path-following state until it arrives at the
destination unless there is a special event.
r3 =
 true if nothing happens and the mission keeps going on.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the pop-up threats appear.
r4 =
 true if the pop-up threats appear.f alse otherwise
• (W4 − W3): The transition happens if the UGV has avoided the threats
successfully.
r5 =
 true if the UGV has avoided the threats.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if the main route has been damaged or
the communication loss has been confirmed.
r6 =

true if the route has been damaged
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W3): The transition happens if the GCS re-plans the route.
r7 =
 true if the GCS re-plans the route.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W6): The transition happens if the UGV enters the GPS denial zone or
an intermittent communication disorder happens.
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r8 =

true if the UGV enters the GPS denial zone
or an intermittent communication disorder happens.
f alse otherwise
• (W6 −W3): The transition happens if the UGV gets out of the GPS denial
zone and the communication has been restored.
r9 =

true if the UGV gets out of the GPS denial zone
and the communication has been restored.
f alse otherwise
• (W3−W7, W4−W7, W6−W7): The transition happens if the UGV self-detects
its fault.
r10, r11, r12 =
 true if the UGV diagnoses its fault by itself.f alse otherwise
Head UGV
• (W3 −W8): The transition is executed if the head UGV arrives at the desti-
nation.
r13 =
 true if the head UGV arrives at the destination.f alse otherwise
Mid 1 UGV
• (W3 −W8): The transition is executed if the mid 1 UGV arrives at the desti-
nation after the head UGV has arrived at the destination or been faulty.
r13 =

true if the mid 1 UGV arrives at the destination
and the head UGV has arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
Mid 2 UGV
• (W3−W8): The transition is executed if the mid 2 UGV arrives at the destina-
tion after the head UGV and the mid 1 UGV have arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
r13 =

true if the mid 2 UGV arrives at the destination
and the head/mid 1 UGV have arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
PhD Thesis: Jiyoung Choi
∣∣∣ 62
Chapter 6. Convoy mission by a group of UAVs and UGVs including fault problem
Tail UGV
• (W3−W8): The transition is executed if the tail UGV arrives at the destination
after the other UGVs have arrived at the destination or been faulty.
r13 =

true if the tail UGV arrives at the destination
and the other UGVs have arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
6.2.4 Kripke model for GCS
The Kripke model of the GCS is the same as the previous model as in the Section
4.2.3.
6.3 Modelling of properties to be veriﬁed
Two properties are verified in addition to the previous properties described in
Section 5.3. One of them is related to redundancy management. Because the aim
of using redundancy is to improve the possibility of the mission completion, the
fault of a particular agent must not affect the execution of the others. To prove
that this property is valid in the multi-agent system considered in this scenario,
the contradictory property is investigated as ‘If mid 1 or mid 2 UGV malfunctions,
then the head UGV must not arrive at the destination.’ Another property is that ‘If both
UAV 1 and 2 are faulty, then the head UGV must not follow the path.’ This property can
be regarded as the safety property of the UGV. UAV 1 performs the surveillance
of the route which the UGVs travel along to inform the potential hazard. The
main mission of UAV 2 is to monitor the group of UGVs to keep them safe as
well. That is, if the UAVs have problems themselves, the UGVs may be exposed
to the hazard directly. Therefore even if this is not considered in a design level, it
is obvious that this property must be kept for the safety of the UGVs.
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6.4 Model checking with MCMAS
6.4.1 MCMAS model
The Agent Environment is the same as before: has five variables expressing the
events and the trigger variable to declare the permanent communication loss.
In the Agent UAV 2, Agent head UGV, Agent mid 1 UGV, Agent mid 2 UGV, and
Agent tail UGV, new state, action/protocol, and evaluation function related to the
fault scenario are added. The modified accessibility relations due to realistic arrival
explained in Section 6.2.3 are reflected in the Agent UGVs as well.
6.4.2 Veriﬁcation result
The verification results from formula 1 to formula 11 are the same as those of
Section 5.4.2 except formula 8. Formula 8 results in ‘false’ which means that even
though the head UGV goes to the standby mode by some events, the tail UGV
does not always change its state to the standby state in all cases. Because the
environmental events influence the decision-making of the agents globally, the
result appears contradictory to this. Besides, two added formula also have ‘false’.
In case of the formula 12, ‘false’ means that malfunctions of some UGVs can not
prevent the mission of the other UGVs from being completed. Therefore, these
negative results can be regarded as correct behaviours. However, the ‘false’ result
of the formula 13 can be a serious problem because it indicates that the UGVs may
keep on travelling along the route even if they lose their eye of the sky.
6.4.3 Analysis and discussion
In this chapter, the fault states of all the agents are integrated with the previous
multi-agent system used in Chapter 5. These aim not only to consider more
possible states in the scenario, but also to explore the scalability of MCMAS with
a larger system in size. Moreover, beyond an occurrence of a fault, the fault-
tolerant multi-agent system is constructed by changing the group-behaviour of
UGVs from the leader-follower logic to the decentralized configuration.
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Figure 6.3: Verification Result
The intention of the design as described above is successfully verified with
MCMAS. MCMAS has no difficulty to verify the extended multi-agent system and
does not face the state space explosion. Furthermore, the properties represented as
the formula 1 to 11, except 8, are proved to hold ‘true’ in all possible cases. In other
words, the additional behaviour and the modified configuration do not violate
the basic properties that must keep in this multi-agent system. Furthermore, the
result of formula 12 represents that the head UGV can arrive at the destination
despite of failure of the mid 1 and 2 UGVs. According to this, it is successfully
proved that the multi-agent system can be regarded as a fault-tolerant system.
The only unexpected result is that of the formula 8. There are two possible
causes of this result which can be inferred from the modification of the system.
The first one is the changed configuration of the UGV swarm. Another one is the
additional fault state of the tail UGV. If the first one is right, it is contradictory
to the design intention as mentioned in Section 6.4.2. Even though the group
of UGVs changes their formation configuration from the leader-follower to the
decentralized logic, the behaviours of each UGV are affected by the environmental
events simultaneously. Therefore, if some event makes one UGV to change its
state to the standby state, the other UGVs must change their state to the standby
state as well. However, if the second possible cause is right, the ‘false’ result of
formula 8 is understandable. Since the tail UGV cannot react to the environmental
events when it is faulty.
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To solve the doubt about the result of the formula 8, its counterexample is
investigated as depicted in Figure 6.4. The head UGV transits to the standby
state because the trigger variable implying the permanent communication loss is
turned to ‘1’. However, the tail UGV does not change the state according to the
trigger variable because it is faulty. In common sense, the decision of the tail UGV
is acceptable. Therefore, this result can be interpreted as an unexpected result
from the additional state in the design level.
Figure 6.4: Counterexample of formula 8
The result of formula 13 is anticipated in the specification stage, differently
from formula 8. The fault state is considered for the both UAVs but, proper
decision-making algorithm for UGVs is not designed against the concurrent mal-
functions of the UAVs. Figure 6.5 is the counterexample of the formula 13. The
states of all UGVs are not connected with the malfunctions of the UAVs. As com-
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mented in Section 6.3, this property must be valid in the system intuitively even
though it has not been considered in the design level. By means of this result,
the feasibility of model checking in the design level can be ascertained again. In
summary, the results of model checking imply that model checking can provide a
designer of autonomous systems with the clues of proactively hedging mistakes
or missing algorithms.
Figure 6.5: Counterexample of formula 13
The analysis of the above counterexamples will be reflected to the improved
scenario in the next chapter. Addition to this, the next scenario will be more
complex because Figure 6.6 reveals that MCMAS still has more potential to handle
a larger size of complex multi-agent system. The execution time is around two
seconds and the used memory is less than nine mega bytes. This is only 0.4 % of
the total memory of the laptop which is used for verification.
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Figure 6.6: BDD information of verification result
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Convoy mission by UAV and UGV
swarms with communications relay
7.1 Scenario deﬁnition
A communication relay represents a station that relays messages between multi-
ple points, so as to facilitate communications between them. Because it extends
a coverage area of communication, there is an increasing interest in the imple-
mentation of communication relays for multi-agent systems [95]. Moreover, the
communication relay can make indirect communication available in the case that
a direct channel between agents is unhealthy. As a result, it can help maximise
the survivability of agents. For that reason, the convoy mission scenario is now
extended to include this communication relay behaviour. As depicted in Figure
7.1, communication among the agents are divided into three parts: channel A
between the UAVs and GCS, channel B between the UGVs and GCS, and channel
C between the UAVs and UGVs. The UAVs can use channels B and C to com-
municate with the GCS when they lose direct channel A, and similarly the UGVs
can use channels A and C to communicate with the GCS when they lose channel
B. In these cases, the UGVs and the UAVs play a role of communications rely
agents to the GCS. Additionally, to reflect the analysis discussed in Section 6.4.3,
the algorithm by which all the UGVs go to the standby mode when both of the
UAVs are not in the sky is considered in this new scenario.
7.2 Kripke modelling of multi-agent system
7.2.1 Kripke model for UAV 1
To make accessibility relations simple, the path-following states are distinguished
by the conditions of direct or indirect communications. Hence, UAV 1 has now six
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Figure 7.1: Convoy mission of multi-agent system using communication relay
Figure 7.2: Kripke model for UAV 1
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states as depicted in Figure 7.2: standby, launch, path-following, path-following
using communications relay, fault, and land. The modified accessibility relations
are expressed as follows.
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if UAV 1 receives the launching command.
r1 =
 true if UAV 1 receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 1 has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if UAV 1 has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 1 performs the path-following.
r3 =
 true if UAV 1 performs the path-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if UAV 1 receives the landing command,
or the communication losses in channel A and B(or C) are confirmed.
r4 =

true if UAV 1 receives the landing command,
or the communication losses in channel A
and B (or C) are confirmed.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5, W6 −W5): The transition happens if UAV 1 self-detects its mal-
functions.
r5, r9 =
 true if UAV 1 detects its malfunctions.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W4): UAV 1 lands if it is faulty.
r6 =
 true if UAV 1 is faulty.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W6): The transition happens if the communication loss in channel A
is confirmed and the other communication channels are healthy.
r7 =

true if the communication loss in channel A is confirmed
and the other communication channels are healthy.
f alse otherwise
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• (W6 −W6): The transition happens if UAV 1 performs the path-following by
using the indirect communication channel.
r8 =

true if UAV 1 performs the path-following
with the indirect communication channel.
f alse otherwise
• (W6−W4): The transition happens if UAV 1 loses the indirect communication
channel.
r10 =
 true if UAV 1 loses the indirect communication channel.f alse otherwise
7.2.2 Kripke model for UAV 2
Compared with the UAV 1, the Kripke model for UAV 2 has been modified to be
more complex as shown in Figure 7.3. There are eight states: standby, launch,
vehicle-following, vehicle-following using communications relay, path-following,
path-following using communications relay, fault, and land.
Figure 7.3: Kripke model for UAV 2
The modified accessibility relations can be represented as follows.
• (W1 −W2): The transition happens if the head UGV is dispatched.
r1 =
 true if the head UGV is dispatched.f alse otherwise
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• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 has launched successfully.
r2 =
 true if UAV 2 has launched successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W3): The transition happens if UAV 2 performs its mission without
any problem.
r3 =
 true if UAV 2 performs the vehicle-following.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4): The transition happens if the communication loss in channel B
is confirmed while UAV 2 performs vehicle-following.
r4 =

true if the channel B is confirmed to be lost
while UAV 2 performs vehicle-following.
f alse otherwise
• (W4 −W4): The transition happens if UAV 2 performs its mission using the
indirect communication channel.
r5 =

true if UAV 2 performs the vehicle-following.
using the indirect communication channel.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W5): The transition happens if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.
r6 =
 true if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W5): UAV 2 keeps path-following unless something happens.
r7 =

true if UAV 2 keeps performing the path-following
unless something happens.
f alse otherwise
• (W5 −W6): The transition happens if the communication loss in channel B
is confirmed while UAV 2 performs path-following.
r8 =

true if the channel B is confirmed to be lost
while UAV 2 performs path-following.
f alse otherwise
• (W6 −W6): The transition happens if UAV 2 performs its mission using the
indirect communication channel.
r9 =

true if UAV 2 performs the path-following.
using the indirect communication channel.
f alse otherwise
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• (W4 −W6): The transition happens if UAV 1 reports its malfunction while
the indirect communication channel is used.
r10 =

true if UAV 1 reports its malfunction.
while the indirect channel is used.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 − W7, W4 − W7, W5 − W7, W6 − W7): The transition happens if UAV 2
detects its malfunction.
r11, r12, r13, r14 =
 true if UAV 2 detects its malfunction.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W8, W4 −W8, W5 −W8, W6 −W8): The transition happens if UAV 2 re-
ceives the landing command, the UGVs have arrived, or the communication
loss is confirmed in both of direct and indirect one.
r15, r16, r17, r18 =

true if UAV 2 receives the landing command
, the UGVs have arrived, or both of the direct
and indirect communication losses are confirmed.
f alse otherwise
• (W7 −W8): UAV 2 lands if it is faulty.
r19 =
 true if UAV 2 is faulty.f alse otherwise
7.2.3 Kripke model for UGVs
The added possible world of the UGVs is the only state in which the UGVs performs
the path-following with the indirect communication channel. Differently from the
state, accessibility relations become more complex as shown in Figure 7.4.
• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the UGV receives the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the UGV has been dispatched success-
fully.
r2 =
 true if the UGV has been dispatched.f alse otherwise
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Figure 7.4: Kripke model for the UGV
• (W3 −W3): The UGV keeps on the path-following state until it arrives at the
destination unless there is a special event.
r3 =
 true if nothing happens and the mission keeps going on.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W4, W9 −W4): The transition happens if the pop-up threats appear.
r4, r16 =
 true if the pop-up threats appear.f alse otherwise
• (W4 − W3, W4 − W9): The transition happens if the UGV has avoided the
threats successfully.
r5, r17 =
 true if the UGV has avoided the threats.f alse otherwise
• (W3−W5, W4−W5, W6−W5, W9−W5): The transition happens if the main route
has been damaged, both of the UAVs have landed, or the communication
loss has been confirmed.
r6, r18, r24, r25 =

true if the route has been damaged,
both of the UAVs have landed,
or the communication loss is confirmed.
f alse otherwise
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• (W5 −W3, W5 −W4, W5 −W6, W5 −W9): The transition happens if the GCS
re-plans the route.
r7, r19, r26, r27 =
 true if the GCS re-plans the route.f alse otherwise
• (W3−W6, W9−W6): The transition happens if the UGV enters the GPS denial
zone or an intermittent communication disorder happens.
r8, r20 =

true if the UGV enters the GPS denial zone
or an intermittent communication disorder happens.
f alse otherwise
• (W6 −W3, W6 −W9): The transition happens if the UGV gets out of the GPS
denial zone and the communication has been restored.
r9, r21 =

true if the UGV gets out of the GPS denial zone
and the communication has been restored.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W7, W4 −W7, W6 −W7, W9 −W7): The transition happens if the UGV
self-detects its fault.
r10, r11, r12, r22 =
 true if the UGV diagnoses its fault by itself.f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W9): The transition happens if the communication channel B is lost
permanently, and the other channels are healthy.
r14 =

true if the communication channel B is lost permanently
, and the other channels are healthy.
f alse otherwise
• (W9 −W9): The UGV keeps on path-following until it arrives at the destina-
tion using the indirect communication channel.
r15 =

true if the UGVs keep on executing mission
using the indirect communication channel.
f alse otherwise
Head UGV
• (W3 −W8, W9 −W8): The transition is executed if the head UGV arrives at
the destination.
r13, r23 =
 true if the head UGV arrives at the destination.f alse otherwise
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Mid 1 UGV
• (W3 −W8, W9 −W8): The transition is executed if the mid 1 UGV arrives at
the destination after the head UGV has arrived at the destination or been
faulty.
r13, r23 =

true if the mid 1 UGV arrives at the destination
and the head UGV has arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
Mid 2 UGV
• (W3 −W8, W9 −W8): The transition is executed if the mid 2 UGV arrives at
the destination after the head UGV and the mid 1 UGV have arrived at the
destination or been faulty.
r13, r23 =

true if the mid 2 UGV arrives at the destination
and the head/mid 1 UGV have arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
Tail UGV
• (W3 − W8, W9 − W8): The transition is executed if the tail UGV arrives at
the destination after the other UGVs have arrived at the destination or been
faulty.
r13, r23 =

true if the tail UGV arrives at the destination
and the other UGVs have arrived at the destination
or been faulty.
f alse otherwise
7.2.4 Kripke model for GCS
In the same way as the previous chapters, the GCS does not have any change
in the possible worlds. However, because there is the indirect communications
channel between the UAVs and GCS, the GCS commands the UAVs to land when
they lose both direct and indirect communication channels. This modification is
reflected in accessibility relations as follows:
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• (W1−W2): The transition happens if the GCS sends the launching command.
r1 =
 true if the GCS sends the launching command successfully.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W2): The state maintains if the GCS performs the image analysis.
r2 =
 true if the GCS performs the image analysis.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W3): The transition happens if the GCS decides the re-planning.
r3 =

true if the GCS decides the re-planning
because of GPS denial or damaged route.
f alse otherwise
• (W3 −W2): The transition happens if the GCS has finished the re-planning.
r4 =
 true if the GCS has finished the re-planning.f alse otherwise
• (W2 −W4): The transition happens if the mission has been completed or the
communication loss is confirmed in both direct and indirect channels.
r5 =

true if the mission has been completed
or the communication loss is confirmed
in both direct and indirect channels.
f alse otherwise
7.3 Modelling of properties to be veriﬁed
All the properties defined in Section 6.3 are employed again with some modifi-
cation. According to the analysis about the result of formula 8 in the previous
chapter, formula 8 is changed to be more reasonable as ‘If the head UGV turns to
the standby state, then the tail UGV must turn to the standby state unless it is faulty.’
Moreover, formula 13 is reinforced to check whether all the UGVs do not keep
going along the path when both UAV 1 and 2 are faulty.
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7.4 Model checking with MCMAS
7.4.1 MCMAS model
The most remarkable change in this MCMAS model compared with the previous
models is that events are divided into two groups: Comm_lost and the others.
To use trigger variables for the confirmation of the communication loss as global
variables, Agent Environment consists of the states of three communication chan-
nels. There are nine states representing valid communication channels: No, chA,
chB, chC, chAB, chAC, chBC, chABC. According to these states, each channel is
decided to be healthy or not, and its temporary variable accumulates its history
during three sequences. Then, three trigger variables announce the confirma-
tion of the communication loss using the history. The remained None, GPS_den,
Route_dam, and Popup are constructed in a new agent part, Agent Env, and have
the same structure as the previous Agent Environment. Also, the rest Agents are
built based on the Kripke model in Section 7.2
7.4.2 Veriﬁcation result
Figure 7.5: Verification Result
First of all, the formula 1 and 2 have ‘false’ results distinctively from the
verification result in Section 6.4.2. They can be interpreted as that the UAVs and
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UGVs do not terminate their mission when they lose the direct communication
channels with the GCS. In case of the formula 8, as explained in Section 7.3, the
property is changed to fit to the modified system including the fault problem.
As a result, ‘false’ in Figure 6.3 is now changed to ‘true’. The decision-making
algorithms related with the property 13 were reflected in this scenario as well.
Therefore, it is now verified that the UGVs stop travelling when they lose the eye
of the sky.
7.4.3 Analysis and discussion
The key behaviour added in this chapter is that of communications relay. The
UAVs and the UGVs are designed to use the indirect communication channel
when they lose the direct communication channel with the GCS rather they termi-
nate their missions. These additional behaviours aim to increase the probability of
the mission completion. As described in Section 7.4.2, the UAVs and the UGVs do
not terminate their missions pursuant to additional decision-making algorithms
using communications relay. It shows that the aim of modifying the previous
system has been achieved successfully.
To assure that the UAVs and UGVs use the indirect communication channels
when they can not use the direct channels permanently, the counterexamples of
the formula 1 and 2 are presented as follows.
In Figure 7.6, the UAVpath (UAV 1) switched its state from Pfollowing (Path-
following) to PFcommrelay (Path-following using communication relay) when the
trigger variable of the channel A turned to ‘1’. As well as UAV 1, the state of
the UAVugv (UAV 2) changed from Vfollowing (Vehicle-following) to VFcommrelay
(Vehicle-following using communication relay) simultaneously. Figure 7.7 shows
that when the trigger variable of the channel B was turned on, the head and tail
UGVs switched their states from Pfollowing to PFcommrelay. Because the mid 1
and mid 2 UGVs were in the fault state, they did not need to be considered.
In summary at last, the heterogeneous multi-agent system in this chapter has
the decision-making behaviours described as follows:
• The UAVs and the UGVs can decide to use the indirect communication
channels when they lose their direct communication channels with the GCS
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Figure 7.6: Counterexample of formulae 1
(proved by the counterexamples of the formula 1 and 2)
• UAV 1 maintains its behaviour despite of an intermittent communication
loss to improve the mission completion (proved by the formula 3)
• The head UGV can make proper decision when it encounters with the GPS-
denying area or pop-up threats. (proved by the formula 4 and 5)
• The GCS can re-plan the mission or decide to terminate the mission when
the main route is damaged. (proved by the formula 6)
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Figure 7.7: Counterexample of formulae 2
• UAV 2 can take the role of UAV 1 when UAV 1 is faulty. (proved by the
formula 7)
• The UGVs can make correct decision against the events for themselves un-
less they are not faulty (proved by the formula 8)
• UAV 2 can decide to land when it lost the communication channels even
though the UGV has not finished the mission according to the high priority
of the property. (proved by the formula 9)
• The UAVs can finish their mission if the tail UGV completes its mission.
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(proved by the formula 10)
• The tail UGV can arrive at the destination at last if the head UGV arrives at
the destination. (proved by the formula 11)
• The head UGV can arrive at the destination independently though the mid
1 UGV or the mid 2 UGV is faulty. (proved by the formula 12)
• The UGV swarm decide to stop path-following when they lose the convoy
by both of the UAVs by safety requirement. (proved by the formula 13)
As the scenario of this chapter became more complex, MCMAS explored more
reachable states as shown in Figure 7.8. Actually, twenty millions of reachable
states in Figure 7.8 are difficult to be handled by numerical simulations. Also, the
MCMAS capability to accommodate even nine agents is remarkable compared
with the other model checkers. These facts represent the superior scalability of
the MCMAS against the state-space explosion problem which many other model
checking tools face. As a result, the proposed scenario considered in this chapter
ascertains the potential applicability of the MCAS for the verification of multi-
agent systems composed of many number of agents.
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Figure 7.8: BDD information of verification result
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Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Summary
This thesis tackled the problems of model checking using MCMAS for verifying
the decision making behaviours of multi-agent autonomous system. The Kripke
model and temporal logic were used to construct the model and specification of
the multi-agent system of interest. Chapter 2 described formal methods with three
processes: formal modelling including the Kripke model, verifiable logics includ-
ing a temporal logic, and model checking tools including the MCMAS. In Chapter
3, a simple surveillance scenario was captured from MoD Grand Challenge where
a MAV flied following waypoints and captured the images of potential threats
and at the same time a GCS received the images from the MAV and analyses them.
From the model checking result with this scenario, it was found that mission com-
pletion can not be guaranteed because of communication loss. To supplement that
system, the modified scenario with adding a substitute MAV was introduced in
the same chapter. Additionally, the concept of confirmation time was used to
decide whether the communication is lost permanently or not. The multi-agent
system dealt with in Chapter 4 was composed of a GCS, a UAV loitering in the
path ahead of a UGV, and a UGV transporting the resources across the battlefield.
Its scenario focused on four events that could potentially deter mission com-
pletion. Moreover, as aforementioned, the communication loss was taken into
account to affect the termination of mission only in the case that it is confirmed
by the confirmation time. The decision making behaviours were specified and
their feasibility were verified using MCMAS. In Chapter 5, the multi-agent system
was extended to a larger system possessing two UAVs, four UGVs, and a GCS to
improve mission completion. Moreover, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 showed a more
complicated multi-agent system with fault-tolerant and communication relay be-
haviours, respectively. The Kripke model, the computational tree logic, and the
MCMAS were also used to abstract the multi-agent system and their properties
and to perform model checking automatically. Figure 8.1 represents the extension
of system in Chapter 3, and Figure 8.2 shows the overview of system extension in
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the convoy scenario. For the convenience, each multi-agent system considered in
Chapters 3 to 7 is named as Sys 1 to 6.
Figure 8.1: System extension of surveillance mission scenario
Figure 8.2: System extension of convoy mission scenario
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8.2 Discussions
This thesis investigated how model checking can be used in the design-level of
operating a heterogeneous multi-agent system. As the multi-agent system was
modified accordingly by reflecting the previous verification result, each chapter
checked the counterexamples of ‘false’ results and successfully found the mistakes
that might be ignored by a system designer. This whole process demonstrates
how model checking can be used for verifying the decision-making logics of
multi-agent systems in the design-level. Moreover, by extending scenario with-
out verifying some behaviours already verified before, model checking can be
considered as an efficient and practical design tool for verification of autonomous
systems.
Figure 8.3: Comparison of BDD data
Figure 8.3 illustrates the comparison of the most important BDD data in each
chapter excluding Sys 1. The execution time never exceeded 2 minutes even
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though the number of reachable states approached 20 million. Because Sys 6
was composed of nine agents including Agent Environment and Agent Env, an
execution time of around 1 minute can be remarkably short comparing with
research using the other model checkers. For example, there is a study using SMV
to verify UAVs which perform road network monitoring [96]. Table 5.3-5.6 in this
thesis demonstrate the effect of number of UAVs/roads on the execution time and
reachable states. As described in Table 5.4 and 5.5, SMV consumed 79 hours and
33 minutes to verify the multi-agent system consisting of four UAVs by exploring
1.25809 million states. In other words, MCMAS can explore almost seventeen
times reachable states only consuming 0.02% execution time.
Moreover, MCMAS shows off its scalability in Figure 8.4. The graphs represent
histories of the execution time, reachable states, and memory in use. The used
memory in each scenario has similar trace with the execution time. Furthermore,
the potential scalability of MCMAS can be inferred from the much lower level of
memory in use than the RAM capacity in the graph.
Figure 8.4: Comparison of memory in use
In conclusion, the result of this thesis clearly affirmed that the MCMAS handled
a multi-agent system easily and efficiently in computation. Furthermore, as this
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study has not yet experienced the state-space explosion despite of the expansion
of multi-agent system in size, it is anticipated that more agents can be handled by
the MCMAS.
8.3 Future Work
As mentioned in Sesction 8.2, the extended multi-agent system possessing ten
or more agents can be dealt with by the MCMAS verification. For instance, the
extended system from the final scenario in Chapter 7 can be constructed: a troop
of UAVs monitor different routes on the ground assigned for an individual UGV
and send the state of routes to the GCS, respectively. The GCS integrates the in-
formation of the routes and decides which route the UGVs can drive along with.
Through this extension, the scenario will become more complex but absolutely
practical. Frankly speaking, the most difficult part in this study was system mod-
elling. It is not easy to capture all the behaviours of a heterogeneous multi-agent
system intuitively. From that reason, the translation program which transforms
a system design to a model checker’s input language is desired to reduce the
effort/mistake of a designer. Also, C, C++, or MATLAB stateflow are widely used
to construct the decision-making algorithms in autonomous system in a recent
time. If a translation program from the C, C++, or MATLAB to the MCMAS
is developed, the verification of a multi-agent system using MCMAS can have
reliability in addition to scalability.
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